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Improving Lawyers’ Judgment:
Is Mediation Training De-Biasing?
Douglas N. Frenkel* & James H. Stark**
ABSTRACT
When people are placed in a partisan role or otherwise have
an objective they seek to accomplish, they are prone to pervasive
cognitive and motivational biases. These judgmental distortions
can affect what people believe and wish to find out, the predic-
tions they make, the strategic decisions they employ, and what
they think is fair. A classic example is confirmation bias, which
can cause its victims to seek and interpret information in ways
that are consistent with their pre-existing views or the goals they
aim to achieve. Studies consistently show that experts as well as
laypeople are prone to such biases, and that they are highly resis-
tant to change, in large part because people are generally una-
ware that they are operating.
When they affect lawyers, egocentric, partisan and role bi-
ases can hinder the ability to provide objective advice to clients,
lead to overly optimistic forecasts about the probability of future
events, and promote “we-they” thinking that can exacerbate and
prolong conflicts, imposing substantial costs on both clients and
society.
There is reason to believe that by placing people in a media-
tive stance—one in which people impartially try to help dispu-
tants resolve a conflict—they can develop habits of objectivity
crucial to much of what lawyers are called upon to do. That this
is so is supported by social science research on two specific strate-
gies for de-biasing judgment—considering alternative scenarios
and taking another’s perspective—both core mediator mindsets.
Research also shows that active engagement in such de-biasing
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Clinic, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
* Roger Sherman Professor of Law and Director of the Mediation Clinic, Uni-
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activity is more effective in achieving objectivity than is mere in-
struction about the existence of cognitive biases. The authors con-
sider the implications of this research for law school clinical
programming and legal education in general.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The two of us are experienced clinical law teachers who for many
years have taught students to work as mediators. We each made the
transition to teaching mediation after first careers teaching and su-
pervising law students in traditional public interest advocacy roles.1
1. Doug Frenkel began his lawyering career as a legal services litigator and en-
tered clinical teaching in 1978 as an instructor in the University of Pennsylvania’s
original litigation-based clinical course. From 1980 to 2008, he served as the Director
of Penn’s clinical education program, overseeing the design and expansion of a curric-
ulum that came to include seven courses set in diverse lawyering roles. In 1986 he
founded Penn’s Mediation Clinic, a course he has led and taught ever since.  Jim
Stark has been a clinical law teacher since 1974.  For the first half of his career, he
primarily did civil rights advocacy work, in fields ranging from prisoners’ rights, to
special education and disability rights, to housing and employment discrimination
litigation. He made the transition to mediation teaching in 1994, and wrote about his
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Over the years, skeptical colleagues (especially clinicians) have
asked, “Why train students in mediation, when most of them will be-
come representative lawyers?” Taking stock of our choices, we de-
cided to articulate what we think may be uniquely valuable about
this work.
Early on in our research efforts, we came across a provocative
finding. A 2008 large-scale empirical study2 of settlement decision
making in cases involving more than 5000 California litigators in
more than 2000 actual contested cases found, consistent with other,
earlier studies,3 that parties to litigation commonly make erroneous
settlement decisions, rejecting  settlement offers that are better than
the results that they ultimately achieve at trial.4 According to the
2008 study, neither case type nor the number of years of their law-
yers’ litigation experience, nor the ranking of the law school from
which their attorneys graduated had an appreciable effect on these
error rates.5 What did matter was whether a party’s lawyer self-iden-
tified as having had mediation training and experience. In most of
the cases in which one or both of the litigants was represented by an
experience two years later. James H. Stark, Preliminary Reflections on the Establish-
ment of a Mediation Clinic, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 457 (1996).
We are grateful for helpful feedback received on drafts of this paper in its various
stages of development from participants at the 2013 Clinical Teachers’ Conference,
the New York Law School Clinical Theory Workshop, the UNLV Law School Psychol-
ogy and Lawyering Conference, the Cardozo Law School Works-in Progress Confer-
ence, the University of Connecticut Law School Faculty Workshop Program, the
American Bar Association Section on Dispute Resolution Webinar and the Quin-
nipiac-Yale Dispute Resolution Workshop. In addition, we wish to express our thanks
to Jon Bauer, Robert Condlin, Art Hinshaw, Jon Hyman, John Lande, Elliott Milstein
and Sean Nolan for their helpful comments along the way.
2. Randall L. Kiser, Martin A. Asher & Blakely B. McShane, Let’s Not Make a
Deal: An Empirical Study of Decision Making in Unsuccessful Settlement Negotiation,
5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 551 (2008) (hereinafter, “California study” or “Kiser et
al.”) For a later, expanded discussion of this study, see RANDALL KISER, BEYOND RIGHT
AND WRONG: THE POWER OF EFFECTIVE DECISION MAKING FOR ATTORNEYS AND CLIENTS
32-86 (2010) (hereinafter, “BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG.”)
3. Kiser et al, supra note 2, at 566-67.
4. Id. at 563, defining a “decision error” as occurring when a plaintiff or defen-
dant rejects an adversary’s settlement offer, proceeds to trial, and finds that the trial
result is substantially the same as, or worse than, the rejected settlement offer—”the
‘oops’ phenomenon.” Overall, plaintiffs made decision errors in 61.2% of their cases,
while defendants made errors in 24.3% of theirs.  However, when defendants made
errors, they tended to be “whoppers,” with a mean error size of $1,140,000. The mean
error size for plaintiffs was $43,100. Id. at 566-67.
5. Id. at 570-71.
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“attorney-mediator,”6 both rates and magnitude of decision error
were reduced—in some classes of cases quite significantly.7
This data—which the authors spend little time attempting to ex-
plain and which raises more questions than it answers—resonated
with our intuitions: that placing law students in a dispassionate
stance—in a neutral, impartial role vis-à-vis competing parties—can
produce distinctive educational advantages in preparing them for cli-
ent representation. To test our intuitions, we decided to examine
what social science research might teach us about the value of dis-
tance, dispassion or neutrality in professional education generally.
We began to look at the extensive behavioral economics litera-
ture on heuristics and cognitive biases and their effects on judgment
under uncertainty, as well as the (less extensive, but still considera-
ble) social science literature on techniques of de-biasing. Might it re-
ally be the case that lawyers trained and working as mediators
develop mindsets that are less subject to cognitive and motivational
bias than lawyers without such training? If so, are such habits of
mind lasting? Do they transfer to other professional roles which a
mediation-trained lawyer might assume? If so (and it is a big “if”),
this would be a finding with potentially significant implications for
legal education.
6. This term was defined, somewhat vaguely, to include lawyers serving on
court-annexed mediation panels, affiliated with private dispute resolution companies,
or designated as members of the Southern California Mediation Association. Id. at
586. Kiser later elaborated on this description, noting that all the attorney-mediators
in his sample had received at least 30 hours of mediation training and that most were
active neutrals with mixed litigation/mediation practices. BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG,
supra note 2, at 49, 52.
7. For example, in personal injury cases, plaintiffs’ decision error rate was
53.2% in the overall sample, but 45.2% in the attorney-mediator sample. Defendant’s
error rate in personal injury cases was 26.3% overall, but only 16.8% when defendants
were represented by attorney-mediators. Kiser et al, supra note 2, at 589.
There are many questions one can raise about the meaning and significance of
these findings.  While lawyers are in a position to exert more or less influence on their
clients’ settlement decisions, it is, of course, clients who ultimately make them. More-
over, not all decisions to reject a settlement offer can be fairly said to constitute a
“decision error.” Litigants often choose to pursue or forgo their claims for personal or
business reasons having little to do with their lawyer’s assessment of the claim’s legal
merits, including for example the desire to vindicate a principle, reduce or impose
costs, or seek or avoid the publicity of a trial.  While it is impossible to know how such
factors play out in specific cases, it is the differential in the overall rate of “decision
error” between clients of lawyers with and without mediation training on which Kiser
and his colleagues focus. This differential is not easily explainable, except perhaps by
reference to something unique in lawyer-mediators’ training and experience. We re-
visit this theme and consider possible alternative explanations infra Part V.
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It is widely assumed that the case method of instruction used in
U.S. law schools inculcates habits of objectivity and dispassionate
judgment in law students that, when internalized, translate into ef-
fective lawyer counseling and decision making. In his well-known
book, The Lost Lawyer,8 for example, former Yale Law School Dean
Anthony Kronman argues that the case method is a way to develop in
law students “powers of sympathetic understanding” about a client’s
objectives, needs and constraints, while simultaneously instilling the
ability to “suppress all sympathies in favor of a judge’s scrupulous
neutrality.”9 Under this view, by  forcing students to reflect on
“whether the case at hand was rightly decided,”10 the case method
develops habits of mind that enable attorneys to be able to make ob-
jective and accurate predictions about judicial decisions11 and other
uncertain future legal events.12
The difficulty with these arguments is that there is little evi-
dence that they are true. Kronman fails to account for the powerful,
unconscious effects that cognitive biases have on human beings’ judg-
ment when they are placed in a partisan role, or for the fact that
these biases affect both laypersons and those with specialized train-
ing and knowledge. A substantial number of empirical studies show,
for example, that despite having been trained to adopt a judicial van-
tage point, litigators are, in general, poorly “calibrated”—i.e., more
confident than accurate—in their predictions of trial verdicts.13
Moreover, lawyers’ biases are not only cognitive, but emotional
and motivational as well, affecting more than just predictive accu-
racy. In general, when people (including lawyers) are placed in com-
petitive roles or settings involving conflict, their views of fairness are
tinged with self-interest.14 They tend to believe that their own posi-
tions and decisions are “fair” and their opponents’ decisions are “un-
fair.” They are the victims of a “bias blind spot” that causes them to
8. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PRO-
FESSION (1993).
9. Id. at 113.
10. Id. at 117.
11. Id. at 134.
12. Id. at 122-28, 138 and passim.
13. See generally BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 2, at 20-28 (summariz-
ing research). See also infra notes 121-34. In one study of the effect of self-serving
biases in predicting trial results, law students were no more accurate than under-
graduate students in their predictions about the trial outcome of a motorcycle acci-
dent case. George Loewenstein et al, Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 149 (1993).
14. See infra notes 58-65.
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think, falsely, that they are able to assess conflict situations with ob-
jectivity.15 They suffer from egocentric biases that cause them to rate
their own performance and worth more highly than that of their
peers and to be overly optimistic about their ability to control future
events in which they are engaged.16 In addition, qualitative research
suggests that many sectors of legal practice (criminal, personal in-
jury, environmental and employment law, to name just a few) are
polarized, with lawyers on one side too often demonizing lawyers who
regularly practice on the other as “enemies of the good.”17
If traditional lecture hall case analysis does not necessarily pro-
duce detached role judgment in lawyers, it is also not clear that
clinical legal education does better. For example, one might expect
law school clinical texts on legal interviewing and counseling to high-
light the many important findings of the last 30 or 40 years on the
unconscious effects of cognitive and motivational distortions on law-
yers’ judgments, and to attempt to provide students with exercises or
strategies for overcoming their own biases. But coverage of these top-
ics in the standard legal counseling texts is spotty.18 And when one
superimposes on this landscape the explicit ideological and social jus-
tice goals that drive a good many law school clinics, one wonders
whether the training being imparted is not as likely to exacerbate
students’ partisan biases as it is to reduce them.19
Our article proceeds in five parts. In Part One, we provide a brief
overview of research findings on the cognitive and motivational bi-
ases that are our focus and explain how they are thought to work and
how they affect human decision making. The research on cognitive
and motivational bias is vast and we make no effort to canvas it all
15. See infra notes 78-79.
16. See infra notes 70-72.
17. See, e.g., Douglas Frenkel, Robert Nelson & Austin Sarat, Introduction:
Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of Ethics and Professionalism, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 697, 703-04 (1998).
18. A few law school client counseling texts do devote brief attention to cognitive
and motivational biases, their potential effects on lawyers, and what lawyers can do
to mitigate the effects of bias. See, e.g., STEPHEN ELLMANN, ROBERT D. DINERSTEIN &
ISABELLE R. GUNNING, LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING 368-73 (2009); and DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS
428-40 (2012); STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING
SKILLS: INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, NEGOTIATION, AND PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS
48-43 (5th ed. 2015) (brief discussion of lawyers’ need to avoid “cognitive illusions”
and think “divergently”). But compare, e.g., G. NICHOLAS HERMAN & JEAN M. CARY,
LEGAL COUNSELING, NEGOTIATING AND MEDIATING: A PRACTICAL APPROACH (2009) (no
discussion of biases); ROGER S. HAYDOCK & PETER B. KNAPP, LAWYERING: PRACTICE
AND PLANNING (3rd ed. 2011) (same).
19. We return to this theme in infra Part V(c).
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here.20  We focus on five broad categories of bias—some of which in-
clude a number of more specific biases—that might affect lawyers’
judgments when they act as representatives for a client.
In Part Two, we offer a very basic primer on how mediators are
trained to think and act, and how their mindset may differ from that
of most representative lawyers when it comes to resolving disputes.
This primer will provide a framework for evaluating the relevance of
the de-biasing studies on which we then focus.
In Parts Three and Four, we summarize in detail empirical re-
search findings relating to two methods of de-biasing judgment—in-
ducing people to “consider the opposite” (Part Three) and to engage in
perspective-taking (Part Four)—that have been employed success-
fully in the laboratory and are beginning to be tested in the field.21
Both of these areas of research are part of a broader social science
inquiry into the use of “mental simulations” or “counterfactuals” to
improve human decision making.
For each area of research, we consider how the empirical findings
on de-biasing relate to the training that mediators receive and the
work that they do. Can the findings from the de-biasing research
fairly be extrapolated to the work of mediators? If so, is there reason
to believe that mediation training and experience reduces the biases
of those who engage in the work?
In Part Five, we identify a variety of research questions that
would benefit from further study. We then discuss the transfer of
habits of thought and behavior from one domain to another. Even if it
is true that mediation training renders students less subject to cogni-
tive and motivational biases than their peers, is there any reason to
believe that this greater objectivity will transfer when they take on
traditional representational tasks as a lawyer? We conclude Part
Five by considering some possible implications of this research for
clinical education programming and for law school curricula more
generally.
The arguments presented in this article are both preliminary
and speculative. As we discuss later in this paper, there are gaps in
the de-biasing research, and it is fair to say that it has not yet caught
20. There also seems to be no overarching or agreed-upon theory of bias, and
similar biases are often described by researchers using different names. See infra
notes 34-35.
21. DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT 45 (2012) (discussing de-biasing efforts in police
investigations).
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up to research on biases themselves.22 Certain biases seem to be
readily amenable to de-biasing interventions, while others may be
more resistant. In some areas, the research findings themselves are
equivocal,23 raising questions as to whether and how they can be ex-
trapolated to the field of mediation. Indeed, given our own commit-
ment to mediation teaching and scholarship, we cheerfully
acknowledge that we may be laboring under a confirmation bias our-
selves in our efforts to draw any lessons from this research.
Nonetheless, most observers believe that research into de-bias-
ing is an important and promising area of empirical inquiry, with the
potential to help us understand how human judgment might be im-
proved.24 As the authors of one study have put it, if bias reduction
could be achieved in the general realm of legal decision making, it
would be a matter of “high public interest.”25 Given the central role
that they play in our justice system, the same, we submit, goes for
lawyers.
II. BIASES AFFECTING LAWYERS’ JUDGMENT WHEN ACTING
IN A REPRESENTATIVE ROLE
Biases that are likely to affect lawyers’ decision making in a rep-
resentative role tend to fall into two broad categories. Cognitive bi-
ases refer to the many tendencies and limitations human beings face
in processing complex information, especially under conditions of un-
certainty.26 For example, even when they know that the best deci-
sions will be produced by open-mindedly considering all sides of a
22. Scott O. Lilienfeld et al., Giving Debiasing Away: Can Psychological Research
on Correcting Cognitive Errors Promote Human Welfare?, 4 PERSP. ON PSYCH SCI. 390,
391 (2009); Derek J. Koehler, Explanation, Imagination, and Confidence in Judg-
ment, 100 PSYCH. BULL. 499, 514-15 (1991).
23. See infra notes 119, 134.
24. See, e.g., Lilienfeld et al., supra note 22, at 393.
25. Christoph Engel & Andreas Glöckner, Role-Induced Bias in Court: An Experi-
mental Analysis, 26 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 272, 273 (2012).
26. The seminal work is Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974) and the edited collection of
the same name that followed it, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BI-
ASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky, eds., 1982) (hereinafter “JUDG-
MENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY”). Other useful general sources we have consulted include
JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING (2007); ROLF DOBELLI, THE ART OF THINK-
ING CLEARLY (2013); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); THOMAS
GILOVICH, HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN’T SO (1991); and GERD GIGERENZER & CHRISTOPH
ENGEL, HEURISTICS AND THE LAW (2006). Among the many scholarly articles we have
consulted, Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in
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question or argument, people tend to engage in single-minded think-
ing.27 They tend to focus on one or two plausible arguments or hy-
potheses that are “good enough,” due to limitations in their ability to
process more complex data or to a kind of mental “fixedness” or iner-
tia that sets in.28 People use mental shortcuts, or heuristics, to guide
their decision making.29 Sometimes, as when speed is required, these
heuristics are adaptive. Often, however, they lead to systematic and
predictable error.30
Motivational biases, by contrast, are distortions in thinking
caused by a desire to believe something because of ideological com-
mitment, ego investment or a stake in the outcome.31 For example,
when people with strong commitments to a social theory are con-
fronted with evidence that contradicts their position, they tend to dis-
count or ignore that evidence, even when it is overwhelming in
nature—the “irrational belief persistence effect.”32 When they are
confronted with information that is threatening, they tend to dis-
count it, due to egocentric biases, such as the desire people have to
feel good about their own attributes and behaviors. Motivational bi-
ases are sometimes conscious and strategic, as when a legal advocate
or politician deliberately spins harmful evidence or polling data to
support a client’s position or a favored policy objective. But motiva-
tional biases, like cognitive biases, often operate wholly uncon-
sciously, making people blind to the weaknesses in their arguments
and positions or the unfairness of their own actions.33
Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCH. 175 (1998) and Daniel Kahneman & Jonathan Ren-
shon, Hawkish Biases (2009), https://www.princeton.edu/~kahneman/docs/Publica-
tions/Hawkish%20Biases.pdf, are, in particular, essential reading.
27. BARON, supra note 26, at 54-55.
28. See, e.g., Derek J. Koehler, Explanation, Imagination and Confidence in
Judgment, 110 PSYCH. BULL. 499, 503 (1991); Michael R.P. Dougherty et al, The Role
of Mental Simulation in Judgments of Likelihood, 70 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 135, 138-40 (1997); Laurence Sanna, Norbert Schwartz & Lindsay Ken-
nedy, It’s Hard to Imagine: Mental Simulation, Metacognitive Experiences, and the
Success of Debiasing, in HANDBOOK OF IMAGINATION AND SIMULATION 205-06 (Keith D.
Markman et al., eds. 2009) (When people are left to their own devices, they tend to
truncate the search process early.).
29. See, e.g., Callia Piperides et al., Group Report: What is the Role of Heuristics
in Litigation?, in GIGERENZER & ENGEL, supra note 26, at 374 (2004).
30. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 26, at 1124; Kahneman & Renshon, supra
note 26.
31. BARON, supra note 26, at 55, 58.
32. Id. at 203-11 (summarizing sources and discussing effects on prosecutors and
police).
33. See, e.g., Vasco Correia, Biases and Fallacies: The Role of Motivated Irration-
ality in Fallacious Reasoning, 3 COGENCY 107, 111 (2011) (People’s judgments can be
consciously or unconsciously biased. When a lawyer produces a biased account of her
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For over 30 years, social science research has produced a contin-
ually expanding list of cognitive and motivational biases, without a
single, overarching classification system or even a universally
agreed-upon vocabulary to describe them.34 Importantly, whether
particular observed biases are primarily cognitive or motivational,
and under what circumstances, is a source of some controversy; social
scientists seem to know more about the effects of certain biases than
the psychological processes that produce them.35 Biases are often
caused by cognitive and motivational factors acting in concert; when
this occurs, a bias may be strengthened in effect.36
Our emphasis here is a selective one, limited by two primary fac-
tors. First, of the myriad cognitive and motivational biases that have
been the subject of social science research, we focus on those that
have been empirically demonstrated to affect lawyers acting in a rep-
resentational role, or for which there is reason to  believe that such
effects may occur.  In the past twenty years or so, legal academics
have devoted considerable scholarly attention to the psychology of de-
cision making as it affects various aspects of law, legal theory
and lawyering.37 Much of this work has focused on the fields of
client’s actions before a court, it is often “impossible to determine whether the lawyer
is deliberately trying to manipulate the audience, or whether the desire to win the
case (or sympathy towards the client, etc.) unconsciously affects her judgment . . . .”).
34. BARON, supra note 26, at 54. The author has constructed his own classifica-
tion table, listing 53 biases, organized into five categories. Compare id. at 56-7, with
Joachim I. Krueger & David C. Funder, Toward a Balanced Social Psychology:
Causes, Consequences and Cures for the Problem-Seeking Approach to Social Behavior
and Cognition, 27 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 313 (2004) (listing 42 biases). Confusing mat-
ters further is the fact that when focusing on the effects of bias on lawyering activities
such as negotiation, legal scholars sometimes lump together what appear to be differ-
ent biases under the general category of “self-serving” bias. See, e.g., Linda Babcock,
George Lowenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased
Litigants, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 913, 915-16 (1997) (using the term to include both
partisan role bias and egocentric bias).
35. See, e.g., Tom Pyszczynski & Jeff Greenberg, Toward an Integration of Cogni-
tive and Motivational Perspectives on Social Inferences: A Biased Hypothesis Testing
Model, in 20 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 297 (1987) (noting that
there “is very little agreement about the psychological mechanisms that produce cog-
nitive bias”). This has obvious implications for understanding how and when de-bias-
ing can be effective. On the “cognition-motivation debate” in the research, see
generally Correia, supra note 33, at 110-11.
36. Nickerson, supra note 26, at 177; Frank Kardes et al, On the Conditions
under Which Experience and Motivation Accentuate Bias in Intuitive Judgment, in
THE ROUTINES OF DECISION MAKING 139 (Tilmann Betsch & Susanne Haberstroh eds.,
2005).
37. For an early review, see, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of
Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1499 (1998).  For a more recent one, see GIGERENZER & ENGEL, supra note 26.
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negotiation and conflict resolution, in which many useful articles
have been produced applying the empirical findings of behavioral
economists and social and cognitive psychologists to help us better
understand the dynamics of bargaining and the reasons why negotia-
tions fail.38 As noted earlier, outcome prediction in litigated disputes
is another aspect of lawyering as to which a good deal of empirical
work has been conducted.39 For these reasons, the research on biases
that arise in negotiation and case prediction comprised the starting
point for our analysis.40
A second limiting factor is that we examined only those biases
and heuristics for which there is empirical evidence of the efficacy of
some de-biasing strategy. As stated in our introduction, at present
the empirical literature on de-biasing has not caught up to the work
38. The scholarship is legion. See, e.g., Richard Birke & Craig Fox, Psychological
Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (1999) (herein-
after, Birke & Fox); KENNETH ARROW, DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY, Conflict
Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth
Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (hereinafter ARROW ET AL.); Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in
Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in ARROW ET AL.; MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT
IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING (5th ed. 2001); MARGARET A. NEALE & MAX H.
BAZERMAN, COGNITION AND RATIONALITY IN NEGOTIATION (1991); Leigh Thompson &
Janice Nadler, Judgmental Biases in Conflict Resolution and How to Overcome Them,
in HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds.,
2000); LEIGH THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR (2d. ed. 2001);
Linda Babcock & George Lowenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997).
39. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litiga-
tion Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1994); George
Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22
J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993); Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful?
Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133 (2010);
Elizabeth Loftus & Willem Wagenaar, Lawyers’ Predictions of Success, 28
JURIMETRICS J. 437 (1988); Kiser et al., supra note 2; Samuel Gross & Kent Syverud,
Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases to go to
Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319 (1991); Jeffrey Rachlinski, Gains, Losses and the Psychol-
ogy of Litigation, 70 S. CAL L. REV. 113 (1996).
40. By contrast to these areas of research, there has been very little study of
cognitive bias as it affects lawyers in their initial client counseling and advising func-
tions.  For example, empirical studies of the primacy effect suggest that data acquired
early is both hard to dislodge and resistant to change. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind et al,
Primacy Effects in Justice Judgments: Testing Predictions from Fairness Heuristic
Theory, 85 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DEC. PROC. 189 (2001) (primacy as affecting judg-
ments of fairness); Nickerson, supra note 26, at 187. It seems highly likely that attor-
neys are prone to this bias, because their frame of reference about any client matter is
apt to be set by the first interview with the client. We assume this to be the case in
some of the discussion that follows, but more research in this area would be useful.
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on the biases themselves.41 For example, cognitive psychologists have
demonstrated that people will often pay an unwarranted, irrational
premium to convert a strong possibility into a certainty.42 Dispute
resolution scholars have posited that this “certainty effect” may lead
lawyers to engage in chronic over-investigation and too much formal
discovery, to the economic detriment of their clients.43 This bias is
excluded from our analysis, however, because we found no research
evidence of any de-biasing strategy that reduces it.
A similar limitation applies to the selection of de-biasing strate-
gies on which we focus in Parts III and IV. For example, it has been
suggested that “directing people to listen in a non-counterarguing
way” and with an “open ear and mind” may be effective in reducing
certain biases.44 While this strikes us as a plausible hypothesis, it
has not yet been tested empirically.
This reasoning led us to consider five general categories of bias45
that can be organized as follows:
Confirmation bias: the tendency, when one has a pre-existing hy-
pothesis, to pursue46 and/or assimilate47 information in ways that
are partial to that hypothesis.48  Confirmation bias is a cognitive
bias, affecting people even when they have no personal commitment
to an issue or stake in any outcome.49 But confirmation bias comes in
stronger, motivated forms as well, as when people are motivated to
41. See Lilienfeld et al., supra note 22, at 391 (“It seems fair to say that psycholo-
gists have made far more progress in cataloging cognitive biases than in finding ways
to correct or prevent them.”) (internal citations omitted).
42. See, e.g., ARROW ET AL. supra note 38, at 51.
43. Birke & Fox, supra note 38, at 21-23.
44. Kathleen A. Kennedy & Emily Pronin, Bias Perception and the Spiral of Con-
flict, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 434-44 (John Hanson ed, 2012).
45. Each of these groupings is thought to include, or be associated with, more
specific biases within that grouping.  As previously suggested, how exactly to classify
these biases is a subject of dispute and is, in some sense, arbitrary.
46. This bias has been variously called biased hypothesis testing and selective ex-
posure to evidence. Compare, e.g., Charles G. Lord, Mark R. Lepper & Elizabeth Pres-
ton, Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1237 (1984) (experiment 2), with BARON, supra
note 26, at 57.
47. This bias has been called biased assimilation of evidence. See, e.g., Charles
Lord, Lee Ross & Marc Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The
Effect of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 2098 (1979).
48. Nickerson, supra note 26, at 175.
49. Id. at 176.
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defend their social theories or beliefs, have allegiances to a “side,”50
or an interest in achieving a particular result.51
Confirmation bias appears in many guises and produces a wide
variety of effects that have been tested empirically. These include
seeking and preferentially evaluating evidence supporting one’s ex-
isting hypotheses or beliefs, avoiding information that challenges
one’s hypotheses or beliefs, restricting one’s attention to favored hy-
potheses, seeing (and remembering) “what one is looking for” and
persisting in one’s beliefs despite contradictory evidence.52 The more
complex and ambiguous the data that is subject to interpretation, the
stronger the likely effects of confirmation bias.53 The more a person
generates54 and reiterates55 arguments in support of a given belief or
hypothesis, the more convinced he or she is likely to become of its
truth.
For obvious reasons, confirmation bias is an occupational hazard
for lawyers. Because they serve as agents for their clients and are
highly motivated (if not ethically bound) to achieve their clients’
goals, lawyers are highly susceptible to the influence of their clients’
viewpoints and narratives. They are called upon to weigh complex
data and make difficult predictions on their clients’ behalf. From the
first interview on, lawyers actively seek and marshal information,
then construct and elaborate arguments in support of their clients’
goals and positions.56 In a litigation setting, the built-in pressures of
the adversary system—to win the case, satisfy the client, appear con-
fident, etc.—may also contribute to lawyers’ tendency to engage in
“my side” thinking.57
50. This is sometimes called “myside bias” (hereinafter “my side bias”) in the
literature. See, e.g., BARON, supra note 26, at 199, 212.
51. Nickerson, supra note 26, at 176.
52. Id. at 187, citing sources. See also Keith Findlay & Michael Scott, The Multi-
ple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2 WISCONSIN L. REV. 291 (2006).
53. Nickerson, supra note 26, at 180.
54. Derek Koehler, Explanation, Imagination, and Confidence in Judgment, 110
PSYCH. BULL. 499, 500 (1991) (reviewing studies demonstrating that “explaining is
believing”).
55. Ralph Hertwig, Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage, The Reiteration Effect in
Hindsight Bias, 104 PSYCH. REV. 194 (1997) (research study finding that repetition of
an assertion increases the degree of belief in it).
56. This may be especially the case for litigators. See, e.g., Laura Steinberg, A
Path to Successful Early Mediation, 32 (4) ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGA-
TION 55 (April 2014).  (In the early stages of litigation, having heard only their client’s
side of the story, lawyers work hard to construct a “compelling narrative” in support
of their client’s claims or defenses.).
57. Findlay & Scott, supra note 52, at 323-25.
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The Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE): this bias, perhaps the
most studied in the field of social cognition,58 is a systematic error in
the way human beings evaluate the behavior or performance of
others, based upon incomplete data.59 When we lack information
about other people’s motives, we tend to assume that the negative
behaviors of the people we like are caused by situational pressures
rather than personal shortcomings. Conversely, we tend to assume
that the negative behaviors of people we dislike or don’t know are
caused by personal character flaws rather than by external
constraints.60
FAE tends to cause us to attribute hostile meanings to other peo-
ple’s motives when those people are in conflict with us, their actions
hurt us, or they are members of opposing (or out-) groups.61 Rumina-
tion about another person’s conduct (common in conflict settings) ap-
pears to increase the strength of this bias.62 Overall, the fundamental
attribution error has been called a ‘hawkish’ bias.63 In dispute set-
tings, it can lead to aggressive behaviors, reactive devaluation of op-
ponents’ offers,64 and escalation of conflict.65
58. Kahneman & Renshon, supra note 26, at 6.
59. Id. at 6-7. For an important early study, see Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psycholo-
gist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN
EXP. SOC. PSYCH. 173 (L. Berkowitz ed., 1977).
60. Kahneman & Renshon, supra note 26, at 7. We also tend to justify our own
negative behaviors as justified by situational pressures and constraints. This is some-
times also called the actor-observer effect. For a recent study, see, e.g., Emily Pronin &
Lee Ross, Temporal Differences in Trait Self-Ascription: When the Self is Seen as an
Other, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 197 (2006).
61. See, e.g., Volkan Topalli & Edgar C. O’Neal, Retaliatory Motivation Enhances
Attributions of Hostility When People Process Ambiguous Social Stimuli, 29 AGGRES-
SIVE BEHAV. 155 (2003). Regarding negative attributions attaching to others by virtue
of their being members of ethnic out-groups, see, e.g., Donald M. Taylor & Vaishna
Jaggi, Ethnocentrism and Causal Attribution in a South Indian Context, 15 J. CROSS-
CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 162 (1974).
62. Roderick Kramer, The Sinister Attribution Error: Paranoid Cognition and
Collective Distrust in Organizations, 18 MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 199 (1994);
Timothy Wilson & Delores Kraft, Why Do I Love Thee?: Effects of Repeated Introspec-
tions about a Dating Relationship on Attitudes toward the Relationship, 19 PERSP. &
SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 409 (1993).
63. Kahneman & Renshon, supra note 26. The authors write: “When hostility
and suspicion already exist, actors will tend to attribute moderate behavior of antago-
nists to situational constraints (‘they had to do that’) while attributing more hostile
actions to dispositions. Bad behavior by adversaries will reinforce prior beliefs, while
good behavior will be disregarded as ‘forced.’ The hawkish position is justified both
when the opponents yield and when they do not.” Id. at 9.
64. Reactive devaluation is the tendency to discount an offer in negotiation be-
cause of the source of its authorship—i.e., it comes from the other side. See, e.g., Lee
Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in ARROW ET AL,
supra note 38.
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FAE is a robust human phenomenon,66 and there is little reason
to think that lawyers are immune from its influence.67 The rules of
engagement are of little help: At the stage of a dispute when lawyers
have been retained but formal litigation might still be averted, pro-
fessional ethics rules prohibit attorneys—unless granted permission
by counsel—from directly communicating with an opposing party to
learn more about the reasons for his or her past conduct, current po-
sitions or demands.68 If a lawsuit is initiated, the formality of the
pleadings and discovery process will likely further stunt communica-
tion between the participants, with the lawyers retreating instead to
a strategic and highly stylized exchange of legal claims, denials and
justifications.69
Egocentric and self-serving biases: Also known as positive illu-
sions, this grouping includes inappropriate levels of confidence in our
own abilities, including our judgment and decision making abilities,
our own contributions to past outcomes, and our ability to predict or
positively control future ones.70 Stress has been shown to increase
people’s preference for strategies fostering a sense of control, even
when that sense is illusory and the strategies are likely to produce
sub-optimal results.71 Egocentric biases also include our general ten-
dency to adopt self-serving norms of fairness, often as a way of pro-
tecting our egos.72
Agents such as lawyers—who are accorded great responsibility
for client matters and often are subject to stress—are not immune
65. Kahneman & Renshon, supra note 26, at 9 and passim.
66. Id. at 7.
67. A search of the PsychInfo database conducted on June 22, 2014 uncovered no
study directly on FAE and lawyers, or for that matter on FAE and agents more
generally.
68. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, RULE 4.2 (2013). The
rule applies to both litigation and non-litigation matters.
69. See generally Michael Moffitt, Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80 IND. L.J.
727 (2005).
70. See Kahneman & Renshon, supra note 26, at 4-6; Shelley Taylor & Jonathan
Brown, Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health,
103 PSYCHOL. BULL. 193 (1988). Hindsight bias, the tendency once people learn the
outcome of an event to believe that it could have been foreseen at the time it occurred,
contributes to this overconfidence. See JENNIFER ROBBENOLT & JEAN STERNLIGHT, PSY-
CHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS 231 (2012). Thus, for example, to the injured plaintiff and her
lawyer, a slip and fall is likely to seem “reasonably foreseeable,” and therefore avoida-
ble by the defendant, after it occurs.
71. Nehemia Friedland et al., Controlling the Uncontrollable: Effects of Stress on
Illusory Perceptions of Controllability, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 923 (1992).
72. See, e.g., Paul Paese & Robert Yonker, Toward a Better Understanding of
Egocentric Fairness Judgments in Negotiation, 12 INT’L J. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
114 (2001).
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from such biases.73 In the litigation and negotiation context, distor-
tions about the fairness of their own and their clients’ actions and
positions, and over-confident expectations regarding likely success,
can lead to more aggressive behaviors, fewer concessions and a
greater chance of bargaining impasse.74
We also briefly mention two other biases because of how consist-
ently they have been shown to affect negotiators75 : a) the fixed pie or
zero-sum bias, a false or exaggerated assumption that mutually bene-
ficial solutions are unavailable76; and b) anchoring bias, the tendency
to be influenced in assessing subsequent negotiation offers by an ini-
tial (and often extreme) offer, or anchor.77
As noted, all of these cognitive and motivational biases may be
compounded by a pervasive “bias blind spot” that causes people to
believe that their own actions are fair and dispassionate, while
others’ acts are tainted with bias.78  Studies show that people tend to
believe that they are less prone to cognitive and motivational biases
than the “average person.”79 In part for this reason, merely
instructing people about different kinds of biases and how they can
73. See, e.g., Markus Glaser, et al., Overconfidence of Professionals and Lay Peo-
ple: Individual Differences Within and Between Tasks?, http://www.wiwi.uni-frank-
furt.de/professoren/schlag/dgf2009/Contribution168.pdf (financial advisors). For a
discussion of how positive illusions may affect legal negotiators, see Birke & Fox,
supra note 38, at 15-20.
74. See, e.g., Margaret Neale & Max Bazerman, The Effects of Framing and Ne-
gotiator Overconfidence on Bargaining Behaviors and Outcomes, 28 ACADEMY OF
MGMT J. 34 (1985).
75. See infra Part IV(A).
76. See, e.g., Max Bazerman & Margaret Neale, Heuristics in Negotiation: Limi-
tations to Effective Dispute Resolution, in NEGOTIATING IN ORGANIZATIONS 51 (Max
Bazerman & Roy Lewicki eds., 1983); Leigh Thompson & Janine Nadler, Judgmental
Biases in Conflict Resolution and How to Overcome Them, in HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION (Morton Deutsch & Peter Colman eds., 2000); Leigh Thompson, “They
Saw a Negotiation”: Partisanship and Involvement, 68 J. PERSONAL & SOCIAL
PSYCHOL. 839 (1995).
77. See, e.g., Margaret Neale & Max Bazerman, COGNITION AND RATIONALITY IN
NEGOTIATION 48-50 (1991).
78. See, e.g., Emily Pronin, Daniel Lin & Lee Ross, The Bias Blind Spot: Percep-
tions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369
(2002); Emily Pronin, Thomas Gilovich & Lee Ross, Objectivity in the Eye of the Be-
holder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781
(2004); Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 37 (2007) (literature review).
79. Pronin, Lin & Ross, supra note 78 (experiments showing that participants
believe themselves less biased than the “average American” (survey 1), the “average
fellow classmate” (survey 2) and the “average international traveler” (survey 3)).
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distort human decision making is thought to be largely ineffective in
reducing their effects.80
Importantly (and not coincidental to our thesis), these biases are
among those that mediators most often encounter in their work.
Their presence often creates impediments to resolution that the dis-
putants and their lawyers cannot overcome on their own.  Diagnosing
and remediating such distortions comprise a large part of what suc-
cessful neutrals do.
III. HOW MEDIATORS ARE TRAINED TO THINK AND ACT, AND WHAT
IS UNIQUE ABOUT THEIR ROLE
Mediators are trained to employ a range of interventions in order
to bring about a reduction and, ideally, a resolution of a conflict. To
master this role, law school mediation trainees need both to demon-
strate generic lawyering abilities and to learn and apply specialized
skills.
Like judges and representative lawyers, mediators of legal dis-
putes are regularly called upon to use traditional skills of legal analy-
sis. When negotiating over rights and responsibilities, most
disputants expect that mediators will have sufficient familiarity with
the applicable law to be able to ask legally relevant questions and
provide legally accurate feedback where desired and appropriate.81
Mediation trainees likewise need to become adept in other generi-
cally important lawyering activities, such as listening, questioning,
explaining, framing and assessing options and persuading. In other
words, much of what they are taught is no different from “thinking
(and acting) like a lawyer.”
80. Id. at 378 (bias blind spot persists even after subjects read and learn about
it).
81. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING MEDIATION QUALITY,
FINAL REPORT at 14 (2008) (study showing that 95% of attorney consumers of media-
tion wanted their mediators to provide an analysis of the case, including strengths
and weaknesses.) Legal feedback of this sort may be especially important in situa-
tions in which participants’ stances are so unreasonable or so uninformed by legal
norms that the integrity of the mediation process might otherwise be called into ques-
tion. See, e.g., Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice
through Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 51, 100 (1996); Judith L. Maute, Public Values
and Private Justice: A Case for Mediator Accountability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503
(1991). See also THE MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, STANDARDS II
AND VI (American Arbitration Association, ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, Associ-
ation for Conflict Resolution, Sept. 2005) (hereinafter, “MODEL STANDARDS”) (allowing
mediators discretion to withdraw from or terminate mediation in case of serious party
imbalance or criminality). But see, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush, Ethical Standards in
Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253 (1989) (arguing that mediators cannot adopt a “protec-
tion-of-rights” approach to their role without compromising their effectiveness).
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But unlike judges (looking for the right result) or advocates
(seeking a desired result), mediators work toward conflict reduction
and, where possible, resolution regardless of the result.82  Put differ-
ently, mediators are change agents, called in to assist disputants in
finding satisfying, or at the very least acceptable, solutions that
might otherwise elude them.83 This goal requires a mindset and skill
set that, if not entirely unique to the mediator’s role, are at least
uniquely important to achieving success in it.
To change how people perceive their conflict and each other, how
they assess their options, and how they negotiate toward a potential
resolution, mediators need to be effective diagnosticians of the roots
of conflicts and the many reasons why unassisted negotiations fail.84
Mediation trainees need to understand various strategic, structural,
cultural, psychological and cognitive barriers to resolution, and to de-
vise appropriate interventions for overcoming them when they are
presented. Such metacognition requires training and knowledge on
how disputants contribute to and experience conflict, what matters to
them in disputing, and how strong conflict and pervasive cognitive
and motivational biases affect parties’ negotiating behaviors and de-
cision making–training that is beyond what most law students or
lawyers receive.
82. Most practicing mediators subscribe to this very pragmatic goal for the pro-
cess, but not all do. See generally ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE
PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT (2d. ed. 2005)
(eschewing a problem-solving orientation to mediation in favor of attempting to
achieve party empowerment and improved relationships). The Model Standards do
make clear that mediators may not pursue “higher settlement rates” for their own
sake if this compromises the goal of working towards voluntary, un-coerced decisions.
MODEL STANDARDS, STANDARD I. B., supra note 81. They also authorize termination of
mediations being used to “further criminal conduct.” MODEL STANDARDS, STANDARD
VI. A (9).  Some state ethics codes for mediators provide similar treatment for agree-
ments that are inherently unfair or unconscionable. See Susan N. Exon, How Can a
Mediator be Both Impartial and Fair? Why Ethical Standards of Conduct Create
Chaos for Mediators, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 387, 403-05, collecting sources. And in cer-
tain mediation contexts, programmatic objectives or industry/ethical norms limit the
agreements that neutrals can facilitate. See, e.g., NANCY N. DUBLER & CAROL B. LIEB-
MAN, BIOETHICS MEDIATION: A GUIDE TO SHAPING SHARED SOLUTIONS, 23-26 (REVISED
ED. 2011) (agreements in mediations over hospital treatment plans constrained by
medical ethics and state law requirements).
83. See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush, What Do We Need a Mediator For?: Media-
tion’s “Value Added” for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. DISPUTE RESOL. 1 (1996).
84. See generally DOUGLAS N. FRENKEL & JAMES H. STARK, THE PRACTICE OF ME-
DIATION: A VIDEO-INTEGRATED TEXT 21-61 (2d. ed. 2012).
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Put another way, as Jon Hyman has argued,85 people entering
disputes generally tell three kinds of stories: “I want mine,” “How
could you do that to me?” and “Why don’t you understand me?” The
traditional law school classroom predominantly prepares students for
the “I want mine” aspects of disputing. The mindset of the represen-
tative lawyer or judge—at least as presented in most law school
classrooms—is an analytic one: fitting facts, data and evidence into
appropriate legal categories in order to justify a decision, advise a
client about his or her options, make predictions about the outcome of
future events, or persuade others to take actions that favor a client’s
interests.
The mediator’s role is more expansive and, in many ways, more
complex. First, there is the distinctive nature of the mediator’s
stance: the mediator works with two (or more) parties in an attempt
to achieve some voluntary convergence of positions or reconciliation
of interests that can lead to a workable solution, but without taking
sides. This is in stark and obvious contrast to the role of an advocate,
whose sole responsibility is to his or her client.
“Without taking sides” requires conscious and sustained effort by
the mediator. Throughout the process, in order to maintain the ap-
pearance of impartiality, the mediator must treat the parties in all
ways as evenhandedly as possible. In addition, preferences regarding
possible outcomes (including but not limited to the tendency to favor
the “right” legal result) must be carefully monitored and suppressed
by the mediator lest he or she override the parties’ own views of a fair
or desired result.
The mediator’s role is further complicated by the strong feelings
that human conflicts often evoke. As we have suggested, for many
disputants the emotional contents of a dispute—the “How could
you. . .?” or “Why don’t you. . .?” feelings of being wronged, disre-
spected, or misunderstood—are far more salient than the “who’s (le-
gally) right and wrong” aspects of a problem on which lawyers and
judges traditionally focus. The emotionality of disputing requires
that mediators be trained to detect, and work through, ripeness
problems (the parties are not ready to let go of their conflict and nego-
tiate), communication distortions (the parties repeatedly mishear
85. Jon Hyman at the 2013 AALS Conference on Clinical Legal Education, Ses-
sion in San Juan, Puerto Rico: “Mediation First, or Last?: A Conversation” (April 29,
2013).  A slightly different and expanded version of this formulation appears in
Jonathan M. Hyman, “The Roots of Impasse in the Mind of the Mediator,” in DEFINI-
TIVE CREATIVE IMPASSE-BREAKING TECHNIQUES IN MEDIATION 41 (Molly Klapper, ed.
2011).
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what each other is saying), and hostile attributions (the parties un-
fairly demonize, or hold distorted views about, the other side or its
viewpoint). Mediators must learn to manage “hot” and potentially
contagious emotions and be able to enter the disputants’ conversation
in a way that demonstrates empathy as well as an understanding of
competing perspectives.
To deal with the strong emotions frequently triggered by conflict,
mediators learn how reduce the sting of angry statements through
“productive reframing”—for example, reframing a highly judgmental
statement (“She already stiffed me once! Why should I trust anything
this woman promises?) into a statement of an interest to be satisfied
(“So any acceptable resolution would have to contain some ‘teeth’ in
the event of non-payment?”).86 They learn how to coach disputants to
express their anger productively, for example by making “I” state-
ments (“When you raise your voice, I get upset and am unable to pro-
cess what you are saying”) rather than accusatory “you” statements
(“Will you please stop being such a jerk!”).87 They learn how to ques-
tion not just for legally relevant facts and evidence, but also for empa-
thy,”88 inquiring—sometimes at the risk of exposing vulnerable
parties or of escalating tensions—about the constraints under which
parties operate and the non-legal effects of their actions on one an-
other. (“Ms. Wilson, can you tell Mr. DiLorenzo how the three-month
delay in getting your kitchen completed and having your repeated
phone calls ignored affected you?”) They learn how, in appropriate
cases, to orchestrate effective apologies. And through role reversal in-
terventions, by which each party is asked to step into the other’s
shoes and consider—in their own words if possible—how the situa-
tion might look if viewed from the other side, the mediator seeks to
make each party’s psychological point of view more understandable
to the other.89  Each of these interventions (and others) require the
mediator to identify and accept a party’s emotional needs.
86. See, e.g., MARK D. BENNETT & SCOTT H. HUGHES, THE ART OF MEDIATION 101-
03 (2d ed. 2005) for useful examples of reframing. However, some mediators—espe-
cially those who adopt the transformative approach—oppose softening or diluting con-
flict in this way. To them, this form of intervention serves to deprive disputants of the
determination over how they wish to express the conflict. See, e.g., BUSH & FOLGER,
supra note 82, at 153-54.
87. “I” statements avoid blame by emphasizing what is important to the speaker,
as in “For me, what this is really about is. . ..” or “What I am feeling is. . ..” See gener-
ally DOUGLAS STONE, BRUCE PATTON & SHEILA HEEN, DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: HOW
TO DISCUSS WHAT MATTERS MOST 185-200 (1999).
88. FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 84, at 183-84.
89. There are many variations in how this can be done: for example, the mediator
can ask each party to articulate the other party’s best legal arguments, identify their
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Mediators seeking convergence of positions or reconciliation of
interests must also learn to deal effectively with cognitive barriers to
resolution, including attribution biases, confirmation bias and (per-
haps especially) egocentric overconfidence. In negotiation, these bar-
riers can cause disputants too readily, and inaccurately, to attribute
bad motives to opposing parties; to assume that their positions are
diametrically opposed, when in fact they may agree about many
things; and persistently to overvalue the strength of their positions
and the fairness of their settlement offers, while unrealistically deni-
grating those of the other side. Where extreme adversarial bargain-
ing or other problematic behavior of a participant poses strategic
barriers to convergence, the mediator is trained to recognize and con-
front such tactics as well.
Importantly, in contrast to the desire for predictability and cer-
tainty (the right or favored outcome) that characterizes the objective
of most arbiters and partisans, effective mediators “question for
doubt,” actively seeking out what’s unclear or ambiguous about any
situation, in order to create legitimate uncertainty in the minds of
overconfident disputants.90 In appropriate contexts, mediators learn
to confront unreasonable or short-sighted participants with the risks
they may face by persisting in their stance.91
strongest pieces of evidence, or consider and state how their past actions and state-
ments might have been experienced by the other side. (“Put yourself in Ms. Wilson’s
shoes. Try to put into words what she was thinking when she made 7-8 telephone calls
over a period of two weeks inquiring about the status of her kitchen and when work
would resume, and none of her calls was answered?”) See generally id. at 238-39.
90. Id. at 193-95. See also Robert Benjamin, The Natural Mediator, 18 (1) Media-
tion News 8-9 (1998) (good mediators are “confused” in that they understand there are
no easy answers, readily see validity in each person’s perspective, and work to “con-
fuse” parties who presume otherwise.)
91. These sorts of doubt-sowing interventions may be equated by some with di-
rective or evaluative conduct by mediators—a hotly contested issue in a field that
holds self-determined participant decision making to be a fundamental norm. The
mindset we are discussing includes, but is by no means limited to, evaluative forms of
mediation. For example, in our view, neutrals who through their questions or state-
ments encourage participants to consider alternative perspectives, consequences or
possible outcomes—i.e., mediators who endeavor to serve as “agents of reality”— en-
gage in “consider-the-opposite” behavior. Such interventions are widely employed by
most resolution-oriented mediators. See, e.g., Leonard Riskin, Mediator Orientations,
Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 111
(1994); James H. Stark & Douglas N. Frenkel, Changing Minds: The Work of
Mediators and Empirical Studies of Persuasion, 28 OHIO ST. J. DISPUTE RESOL. 263,
268 (2013). But such mediator persuasion has its limits: it must stop short of coercion
and requires the neutral to refrain from acting on pro-settlement motives (such as the
desire for high settlement rates) under which he may be such operating. See supra
note 82.
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In short, succeeding at their task requires mediators to look at a
dispute through a “bifocal”92 or “external”93 lens, listening for oppor-
tunities to help the parties to see the conflict, their objectives, their
risks and each other in new (and de-biased) ways. Mediators are
aided in this effort by the distinctive nature of the mediation process
which, in most94 settings, includes the ability to conduct both face-to-
face participant talks (“joint” or “plenary” sessions) and private,
party-mediator discussions (“caucuses”), timed to serve the needs of
the dispute. The caucus—unique to mediation in the landscape of dis-
pute resolution processes—affords the mediator a confidential space
in which to give voice to “alternative” or oppositional thinking, with
less danger of compromising his or her perceived neutrality.
What impact might repeated experience with this kind of think-
ing and acting have on the mediator? Might this mindset or any of
the interventions mediators commonly utilize to induce change in dis-
puting parties reduce the biases of mediators themselves?
IV. DE-BIASING BY “CONSIDERING THE OPPOSITE”
Over the past thirty years or so, in addition to cataloging differ-
ent types of cognitive and motivational biases and analyzing how
they function, social scientists have begun to investigate a variety of
“mental simulation”95 prompts that may help to reduce human bias.
Mental simulation prompts are interventions that ask subjects to
generate or explain alternatives to beliefs, hypotheses, explanations
or predictions on which they have focused. The potential de-biasing
92. “Bifocalism” is the ability to see the same situation from multiple perspec-
tives. David Brooks, Why Elders Smile (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
12/05/opinion/david-brooks-why-elders-smile.html?smid=nytcore-ipad-
share&smprod=nytcore-ipad.
93. An “external” vantage point allows switching among viewpoints, including
those with which one may disagree. Adam D. Galinsky et al., Using Both Your Head
and Your Heart: The Role of Perspective Taking and Empathy in Resolving Social
Conflict, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL CONFLICT AND AGGRESSION 106 (Joseph P.
Forgas, Arie W. Kruglanski & Kipling D. Williams, eds. 2011).
94. Not all mediation practitioners recommend this model of mediation and not
all programs utilize it. See, e.g., GARY FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING
CONFLICT (2009) (advocating no-caucus model of mediation). But see, e.g., Christopher
W. Moore, The Caucus: Private Meetings That Promote Settlement, 16 MEDIATION Q.
87 (1987).
95. The term of art “mental simulation” was originally coined by noted psycholo-
gists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky to denote the mental processes by which
people construct scenarios, make predictions, assess probabilities and evaluate causal
statements, resembling the running of a simulation model. See Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra
note 26, at 201-08.
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effect of such prompts has been the subject of investigation in a vari-
ety of domains, including beliefs about contested social theories, pre-
dictions of future events, explanations about past events and their
causes, levels of confidence in one’s own abilities or judgment, and
attributions concerning other people’s attitudes, character or
conduct.
One such method of de-biasing that has drawn a good deal of
research attention involves “consider the opposite” prompts—inter-
ventions that ask subjects to generate, list, explain or imagine in de-
tail reasons why their answer, their hypothesis, their prediction of
future events, or their proposed decisions might be wrong. Do such
prompts reduce “my side” thinking, and make people more open-
minded, flexible thinkers and decision-makers?  This question has
been studied empirically in a variety of domains.
Take, for example, the domain of social theories. A considerable
body of research evidence demonstrates that, once formed, human be-
liefs about complex social theories and contested historical events are
highly resistant to change.96  On balance, does taxing the wealthy at
a higher marginal rate help or hurt the economy?  Who was the first
aggressor: Trayvon Martin or George Zimmerman? When people de-
velop theories about such questions, they tend to seek information
supporting them, and to assimilate it in a way that ignores or ex-
plains away contrary information.
In an early study demonstrating these effects, Charles Lord and
his research colleagues asked 48 Stanford University undergraduate
student subjects, identified as proponents or opponents of capital
punishment and divided into “pro” and “con” groups, to read two em-
pirical studies (consisting of short methodology descriptions and con-
clusion summaries), one study supporting its effectiveness as a
deterrent to crime, the other showing no deterrent effect at all.97  Af-
ter reading the two opposing studies, each group, on average, thought
that the study supporting its preexisting views was logically superior
to one opposing its views. Not only that, but after reading the contra-
dictory evidence from the two studies, each group felt more commit-
ted to its original position—and more polarized in its beliefs—than
96. See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson, Inoculation and Counterexplanation: Debiasing
Techniques in the Perseverance Social Theories, 1 SOCIAL COGNITION 126 (1982).
97. Lord, Ross & Lepper, supra note 47.
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before.98 This is a classic example of assimilation bias in action—in-
terpreting mixed evidence in a way that supports one’s pre-existing
convictions.99
In a follow-up study five years later, however, it was found that
“consider the opposite” (CTO) instructions can mitigate this bias.100
Again, researchers gave subjects who had earlier indicated support or
opposition to capital punishment two opposing study summaries to
read. Respondents were then divided into three groups, consisting of
20 opponents and 20 supporters each. As in the 1979 study, the first
group was given no special instructions before reading the material,
and the attitudes of that group’s members became more polarized af-
ter reading both studies.  Respondents in a second group were in-
structed (as a judge would a jury) “to be as objective and unbiased as
possible in evaluating the studies you read.”101 This prompt was
wholly ineffective in reducing bias; the attitudes of the respondents
in this second group were just as polarized after reading the studies
as that of those in the first group.102
Only respondents in the third group—instructed to consider the
opposite, specifically to “ask yourself at each step whether you would
have made the same high or low evaluation had exactly the same
study produced results on the other side of the issue”—experienced
significantly less polarization of beliefs than the other two groups.
The authors conclude that CTO prompts may overcome biased assim-
ilation of new information.103
Researchers have also studied the effects of CTO instructions on
a related cognitive bias: biased hypothesis testing, the tendency to
seek out evidence that confirms one’s preexisting hypotheses. In
criminal investigations, for example, once investigators focus their
attention on a prime suspect, biased hypothesis testing may cause
them to look for evidence that supports, and disregard evidence that
98. Id. at 2102-08.
99. As one scholar puts it, people tend to use biased criteria to evaluate new in-
formation, with the nature of the bias depending on whether the information supports
or contradicts their existing viewpoints. New data is readily accepted if it at all sup-
ports one’s existing opinions, but not accepted unless it compels an opposing view. See
GILOVICH, supra note 26, at 55-56.
100. Lord, Lepper & Preston, supra note 46 (experiment 1).
101. Id. at 1233.
102. Id. at 1233-36.
103. Id.
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challenges, their theory of the case, increasing the risk of false convic-
tions. Previous studies have shown that biased hypothesis testing is
difficult to overcome.104
A recent two-part study illustrates how CTO instructions may
reduce this bias.105  In Study 1, college student subjects were asked
to read the first half of a police file that described the early stages of
an investigation of a home invasion and shooting and raised weak
circumstantial inference that a particular suspect (“Bill Briggs”) was
guilty of the crime. Subjects were then randomly assigned to one of
two groups. The first (hypothesis-forming) group was told, “It’s early
in the investigation and there’s a lot more work to do, but based on
what you know now, who do you think is most likely the person who
shot Marks?” and then to explain the reasons for, and rate their de-
gree of confidence in, their choice. The second (control) group was not
given these instructions.106
Both groups then read the second half of the file, which con-
tained more evidence against the prime suspect, but also provided
new evidence raising substantial doubts about his guilt. After read-
ing the entire file, both groups still favored Briggs as the probable
shooter, but the group that had been asked to articulate and explain
its initial hypotheses did so to a significantly greater extent than the
second group. Its respondents “remembered the facts as more consis-
tent with Briggs’s guilt, advocated more lines of investigation focused
on him, and subtly shifted their opinions about matters relevant to
determining guilt in a way that supported initial suspicions. Thus,
the simple act of naming a suspect and generating reasons for suspi-
cion—something investigators often do—worsened bias on several
measures.”107
Study 2 largely replicated study 1, with the following change:
some subjects (called the “counter-hypothesis” group) were asked not
only to articulate who they thought committed the crime and why,
but also to explain why their hypothesis might be wrong and why
that person might be innocent. This instruction was effective at re-
ducing bias. This counter-hypothesis group was less biased than the
comparable hypothesis-forming group in study 1 and no more biased
in its judgments about guilt than the non-hypothesis-forming
104. Id. at 1237.
105. Barbara O’Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that Aggravate
and Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 315 (2009).
106. Id. at 319-320.
107. Id. at 324.
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group,108 including its willingness to seek information inconsistent
with the prime suspect’s guilt.109
Surveying the field as a whole, CTO prompts have been shown to
reduce cognitive biases and improve decision making in many do-
mains not involving strong motivational investment. They have been
found to reduce subjects’ overconfidence in the accuracy of their an-
swers to general knowledge questions,110 to reduce belief persistence
in the face of disconfirming evidence,111 and to reduce anchoring bias
in experts’ judgment of value.112 They have been shown to improve
evaluation of complex data in decision-making,113 as well as to im-
prove flexibility in thinking causally about why past events may have
occurred.114 Several researchers have suggested that CTO prompts
improve flexibility and open-mindedness in thinking by breaking peo-
ple’s natural resistance to the consideration of alternatives once they
have settled on a focal hypothesis.115
Perhaps surprisingly, CTO prompts have also been shown to be
de-biasing in situations involving subjects’ strong motivational or ego
108. Id. at 327-29.
109. Id. at 325.
110. Asher Koriat, Sarah Lichtenstein & Baruch Fischhoff, Reasons for Confi-
dence, 6 J. EXP. PSYCHOL: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 107, 107-118 (1980) (experiment
1: a prompt requiring subjects to “specify all reasons favoring or opposing each of your
answers” improved calibration between the predicted and actual number of correct
answers chosen).
111. Anderson, supra note 96, at 126.
112. Thomas Mussweiler, Fritz Strack & Tim Pfeiffer, Overcoming the Inevitable
Anchoring Effect: Considering the Opposite Compensates for Selective Accessibility, 26
PERSP. SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1142 (2000) (small effect; article notes that anchoring is a
particularly robust cognitive bias, one that is hard to dislodge); see also Jessica Wil-
dermuth, The Application of Federal and Texas State Sentence Ranges in a Consider-
The-Opposite Paradigm: Can the Magnitude of Bias in Sentencing Decisions be Re-
duced? (Dec. 2008) (Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, The University of Texas at El
Paso) (CTO partially supported: the more reasons given to support or refute sentence
anchor, the less punitive sentences subjects gave, but only where sentence anchor was
high.).
113. Laura J. Kray & Adam D. Galinsky, The De-biasing Effects of Counterfactual
Mind-sets: Increasing the Search for Disconfirmatory Information in Group Deci-
sions,” 91 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DEC. PROCESSES 69 (2003) (simulated decision
whether or not to fly Space Shuttle Challenger mission under specified weather
conditions).
114. See Michael R. P. Dougherty et al., The Role of Mental Simulation in Judg-
ments of Likelihood, 70 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 135
(1997).
115. Derek Koehler, Explanation, Imagination, and Confidence in Judgment, 110
PSYCHOL. BULL. 499, 503 (1991); Edward R. Hirt & Keith D. Markman, Multiple Ex-
planations: A Consider-an-Alternative Strategy for Debiasing Judgments, 69 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1069, 1071 (1995).
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investment—at least sometimes. In one study, for example, CTO in-
structions reduced college football fans’ overconfident predictions,
owing to allegiance bias, about the likely success of their home teams
in upcoming games.116 In another, they mitigated the effects of parti-
san political bias on subjects’ predictions about the outcome of the
1976 presidential election.117 In a third study, MBA student-subjects
asked to predict the timing and number of job offers they would re-
ceive upon graduation, and their projected starting salaries, were
much more accurate in their predictions when asked to list reasons
why their optimistic scenarios might not be achieved.118 In other ex-
periments involving both cognitive and motivational bias, however,
this effect has not always been replicated.119
One factor that seems to affect the efficacy of CTO prompts is the
depth of processing required of the subject. It has been shown that
the more elaborate the causal connections that a subject is asked to
create when explaining an alternate hypothesis, or the more vividly
the subject is asked to imagine a future outcome, the more available
that hypothesis will seem to the subject and the more effective a CTO
prompt is likely to be.120
116. Keith D. Markman & Edward R. Hirt, Social Prediction and the ‘Allegiance
Bias,’ 20 SOC. COGNITION 58 (2002) (As de-biasing intervention, subjects required to
explain and justify their predictions to persons with unknown rooting allegiances.).
117. See John S. Carroll, The Effect of Imagining an Event on Expectations for
That Event: An Interpretation in Terms of the Availability Heuristic, 14 J. EXP. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 88 (1978).
118. Stephen J. Hoch, Counterfactual Reasoning and Accuracy in Predicting Per-
sonal Events, 11 J. EXP. PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY AND COGNITION 719 (1985).
119. For example, the CTO de-biasing effect that Lord and his colleagues found in
their capital punishment experiment was not replicated in a follow-up dissertation
study. Daniel Laughlin, Consider the Opposite: An Application of Scientific Thinking
to Mitigate Assimilation Bias, (Nov. 21, 2001) (Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Ameri-
can University) (CTO only partially supported: significant effects of CTO instruction
on views about technology in education; some effects, but not reaching statistical sig-
nificance, on views about capital punishment). Similarly, in some studies of egocentric
overconfidence, CTO prompts have been shown to reduce subjects’ overly optimistic
predictions concerning other people’s future conduct, but not their own. See, e.g., Ian
R. Newby-Clark et al., People Focus on Optimistic Scenarios and Disregard Pessimis-
tic Scenarios When Predicting Task Prediction Times, 6 J. EXP. PSYCH.: APPLIED 171
(2000).
120. Koehler, supra note 115, at 506-07, citing sources; Derek J. Koehler, Hypothe-
sis Generation and Confidence in Judgment, 20 J. EXP. PSYCHOL: LEARNING, MEMORY
& COGNITION 461, 467 (1994) (Subjects who generate their own alternative hypothe-
ses show less optimistic overconfidence than those who are presented the same alter-
native hypotheses for evaluation.). Other factors found to affect the efficacy of CTO
prompts include the subject’s ease or difficulty in generating alternative hypotheses
after prompting. Lawrence J. Sanna, Norbert Schwarz & Shevaun L. Stocker, When
Debiasing Backfires: Accessible Content and Accessibility Experiences in Debiasing
Hindsight, 28 J. EXP. PSYCHOL: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 497 (2002) (Study
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A. “Consider the Opposite” and Legal Disputing
It has repeatedly been demonstrated that even random assign-
ment to “pretend” adversary lawyering roles leads to significant bias
in the way that subjects assess evidence, make predictions, and be-
have. The effects of such role assignments appear to take hold imme-
diately. In one simulated negotiation study,121 for example, George
Loewenstein and his research colleagues gave a group of 160 under-
graduate and law students identical case file materials from a re-
cently litigated, factually ambiguous  motorcycle accident case, tried
by a judge without a jury, in which the plaintiff had requested
$100,000 in damages. Students were randomly assigned to the role of
“plaintiff” or “defendant” and asked to predict, based on the file, what
monetary award the judge would order and what award would be
“fair.” They were then paired off and instructed to negotiate in an
effort to reach a settlement.
The researchers found, on average, that students assigned to the
role of plaintiff predicted an award by the judge that was more than
$14,500 higher than that predicted by students assigned to the defen-
dant role.122 They found that role assignment caused a bias in both
recall and weighting of arguments: each side recalled more argu-
ments favoring their side’s position than those favoring the other
side, and believed that a judge or jury would find “their” arguments
superior to opposing ones.123 Finally, the researchers found that the
larger the difference in predicted judicial awards within each negoti-
ating pair, the greater the likelihood of bargaining impasse.124  A
number of other studies have reported similar findings, irrespective
showing that de-biasing efforts backfired when subjects asked to generate as many as
ten alternative possible outcomes—a task they experienced as difficult). In addition,
it has been hypothesized that the inherent plausibility or implausibility of alterna-
tives under consideration may influence whether particular CTO prompts will work.
Craig A. Anderson, Inoculation and Counter-Explanation: Debiasing Techniques in
the Perseverance of Social Theories, 1 SOC. COGNITION 126 (1982); Koehler, supra note
115, at 507.
121. Loewenstein et al, supra note 13.
122. Id. at 150, 153.  This difference in monetary prediction was approximately
one-half of the judge’s actual total award, causing the researchers to characterize the
magnitude of the bias as “large.”
123. Id. at 154.
124. Id. at 153.
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of whether subjects were assigned to a party125 or party representa-
tive126 role.
Given that “my side” bias occurs so readily in simulated cases
involving no real clients or stakes, it is hardly surprising that re-
search evidence also suggests that lawyers are not very good at eval-
uating evidence and making predictions about actual case outcomes.
In one early study containing three separate experiments, civil and
criminal litigators were asked to think about a case of theirs that was
going to trial soon, specify a minimum goal they would like to achieve
in the case in order to feel “successful,” and estimate their chances of
obtaining that goal. Later, subjects were asked to report the results
that they actually achieved in their case. The results of the study
showed that lawyers tended to be overconfident in their predictions of
future success.127
Can “consider the opposite” prompts reduce overconfidence bias
and promote settlements in a dispute resolution context? In one sim-
ulation study,128 the answer was decidedly “yes.” In 1997, Loewen-
stein and his research associates replicated and expanded on their
earlier motorcycle accident experiment demonstrating the correlation
between overconfident predictions of trial outcomes and bargaining
impasse.129 They divided 98 MBA students from the University of
Chicago and the University of Pennsylvania into a control group and
125. See, e.g., Leigh Thompson & George Lowenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of
Fairness in Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISIONAL
PROCESSES 176, 183-4 (experiment 1: assignment of student negotiators to union or
management role in simulated labor dispute); Paul W. Paese & Robert D. Yonker,
Toward a Better Understanding of Egocentric Fairness Judgments in Negotiation, 12
INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 114 (2001) (estimate of fair wages in a simulated union-
management dispute).
126. See, e.g., Engel & Glöckner, supra, note 25 (assignment to defense counsel or
prosecutor role led to role-induced bias in predicting outcome in criminal case, and in
subsequent plea-bargaining discussions); Dan Simon, Doug Stenstrom & Stephen
Read, Adversarial and Non-Adversarial Investigations: An Experiment, SOCIAL SCI-
ENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (May 15, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=1401723 (academic misconduct case involving ambiguous allegation of cheat-
ing; assignment of subjects to  investigator roles representing either the student or
the university led to biased assessment of evidence in the direction of the party
assignment).
127. Elizabeth F. Loftus & Willem A. Wagenaar, Lawyers’ Prediction of Success,
28 JURIMETRICS J. 437 (1988). This finding was recently replicated in a study with a
larger sample (481 civil and criminal attorneys). See, Jane Goodman-Delahunty, et
al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 133 (2010).
128. Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Creating Conver-
gence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 913 (1997) (hereinafter
“Babcock, et al.”).
129. Loewenstein et al, supra note 13, at 145.
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“de-biasing condition” group, each containing plaintiff and defendant
representatives. All students were given financial or grade incentives
for making verdict predictions close to the actual verdict awarded by
the judge in the  case ($30,560, on the claim for $100,000), as well as
for achieving a favorable settlement efficiently. Before negotiating,
students in the de-biasing condition group were given a “think care-
fully about the weaknesses in your case” prompt,130 not given to the
control group.
The researchers found that this CTO prompt was highly effective
at reducing bias and promoting settlement. 35% of paired negotiators
in the control group were unable to reach any settlement within the
assigned 30-minute negotiating period (in which simultaneous sealed
bid offers had to be made every five minutes), whereas only 4% of
negotiators in the de-biasing group failed to reach agreement. In the
control condition, there was more than a $20,000 difference, on aver-
age, in the predicted awards of plaintiff and defendant representa-
tives; in the de-biasing condition, the difference was on average less
than $5,000.131
However, in a subsequent study of overconfidence bias on the
part of practicing lawyers in actual cases, researchers were unable to
replicate this result.132 481 civil and criminal trial lawyers were
asked to think about a case of theirs in litigation, specify a minimum
desired goal for that case, and predict their chances (from 0 to 100%)
of achieving that goal. Half of the subjects were asked to list reasons
130. In its entirety, the de-biasing prompt read as follows:
In experiments based on this case we have found evidence of “self-serv-
ing interpretations of fairness.” When we ask plaintiffs and defendants to
predict the ruling of the judge, and to tell us what they think is a fair settle-
ment of the case, plaintiffs’ answers to both questions are typically $20,000
greater than defendants’. Furthermore, when the difference between the
plaintiff and the defendant is large—when the plaintiff thinks a much higher
settlement is fair than does the defendant—the parties are much less likely
to settle the case and more likely to “go to court” and incur legal expenses.
This occurs because each side is “holding out” for what they legitimately
think is a fair settlement.
Disputants don’t always think carefully about the weaknesses in their
own case and are therefore surprised when the judge’s ruling is worse than
their expectations. For plaintiffs, this means that the judge’s award is worse
than their expectations. For defendants, this means that the judge’s award is
often greater than their expectations. Therefore, please think carefully about
the weaknesses in your case. In the space below, please list the weaknesses
in your own case.
Babcock et al., supra note 128, at 917-18. Original casefile materials on file with
authors.
131. Id. at 818.
132. Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 127.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HNR\21-1\HNR101.txt unknown Seq: 31 31-MAR-16 9:08
Fall 2015] Improving Lawyers’ Judgment 31
on a written questionnaire for why they might not achieve their goals
before making a prediction of their chances of success. The remaining
subjects (the control group) were also asked to specify reasons why
they might not achieve their goals, but only after they had provided
an estimate of their chances of success. Later, researchers compared
actual litigation or negotiation case results with the attorneys’ earlier
predictions. The lawyers given a CTO prompt before making an out-
come prediction were not significantly more accurate in their predic-
tions than the lawyers in the control group.133 Commenting on the
discrepancy between these research findings and those reported in
the earlier Lowenstein simulation study, the authors conclude: “[a]
more profound investment in the outcome of real-life cases may in-
crease resistance to de-biasing interventions.”134
B. Mediation Questions and Applications
How might this research pertain to the work of mediators? Is
there something about the mediator’s role that may suggest a de-bi-
asing effect of mediation training and practice? Two fundamental
components of the neutral’s role inform our discussion.
First, because the goal of most135 mediators is conflict reduction
and, if possible, resolution by agreement, they seek to ensure that the
parties’ perceptions and predictions are informed by realistic consid-
erations where warranted and thus brought into closer alignment
with each other.
Second is the mediator’s fealty to the norms of neutrality and
impartiality. While seeking such convergence, the mediator should
have no investment in any specific substantive outcome reached at
the bargaining table and should treat all parties as evenhandedly as
possible.136 Mediator Kenneth Cloke has argued that “impartiality”
is really a kind of “omni-partiality;” the mediator is on the “side” of
133. Id. at 150-51.
134. Id. at 151.  However, we note that attorneys in both groups were given CTO
prompts, the only difference being their timing.  Although the authors did not com-
ment on this feature of the research design, it is possible that it also contributed to
the outcome. We also note that the specific de-biasing prompt given in the Babcock et
al. study, supra note 130, was highly suggestive in content, which may have contrib-
uted to its effectiveness.
135. But see supra note 82.
136. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, § II.A (“A Mediator shall de-
cline a mediation if the mediator cannot conduct it in an impartial manner.  Imparti-
ality means freedom from favoritism, bias or prejudice.”) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Am.
Bar Ass’n Section of Dispute Resolution, Ass’n for Conflict Resolution, 2005).
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both of the parties, trying to help each find a resolution that meets
his or her needs.137
At a cognitive level, honoring these norms requires a serious ef-
fort by the mediator to listen to each party open-mindedly, with a
deep focus on that individual’s views, perspectives and concerns.
Mediators are placed in a position that requires them to suspend
(and, ideally, suppress) any judgments they may make in order to
flesh out and momentarily “accept” each disputant’s competing ver-
sion of contested events, their contrasting views about what’s “fair,”
their differing interests and priorities, and their differing predictions
about the future. Active mediators often go a step further, pointing
out alternative perspectives regarding the dispute that both sides
may have overlooked. In effect, as the mediation unfolds, the neutral
is, of necessity, engaged in an ongoing process of “considering the
opposite.”
In order to achieve his objective, the neutral works to insure that
disputants engage in such a process as well. At a behavioral level,
mediators interact with disputants in different ways, depending on
their mediation philosophy, and contextual variables presented in
particular disputes. Less directive mediators are likely to ask the
parties questions to try to encourage suspension of their focal beliefs
and hypotheses and prod them to consider alternative viewpoints and
potential outcomes. (“Have you thought about [this piece of evidence?]
[“. . . Mrs. Robbins’ argument that . . .”]  [“. . . how your behavior on
that day might look to a judge?”] “While you clearly want to limit your
husband’s visits to every other weekend, have you considered how your
daughter might feel not seeing him for two weeks at a time?”)
More directive mediators (or those working with participants
who seem unreasonably “dug in”) are apt to make statements de-
signed to prompt less biased thinking, by pointing out possible case
weaknesses, other people’s viewpoints, or even different ways they
might frame their own decisions. (e.g., “While it’s possible that a
judge might exclude that piece of evidence, because of [x], it strikes me
as more likely that she will admit the evidence because of [y]” “Mrs.
Robbins, you’ve argued that [A] outcome is likely.  Mr. Campbell has
argued that [B] outcome is more likely.  It seems to me that [C] out-
come—which neither of you desire—is also quite possible. Have you
thought of that?” “Having custody every Saturday night gives you lots
137. KENNETH CLOKE, MEDIATING DANGEROUSLY: THE FRONTIERS OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 13 (2001).
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of quality time with your daughter.  But it’s certainly not an ideal ar-
rangement if you want to have an adult social life again.”).
To achieve the desired convergence, mediators are thus com-
pelled to think about disputes in a “bipolar” if not “multi-polar” way
that partisan lawyers do not have to. The job of the partisan lawyer,
traditionally defined, is to achieve the lawful objectives of her client
to the maximum extent possible. The partisan lawyer is invested in
particular substantive outcomes and charged with the task of prefer-
ring her client’s goals over the goals of others. If the research on cog-
nitive bias is valid, then from the initial lawyer-client interview on,
the partisan lawyer is likely to assume—consciously or not—a confir-
matory strategy in seeking and evaluating evidence related to the cli-
ent matter.
The most effective lawyers do of course bring a measure of dis-
passion, objectivity and even “oppositional thinking” to client repre-
sentation tasks. Empirical evidence suggests that, across the
spectrum of lawyers, there may be substantial variation in individual
lawyers’ ability to achieve such objectivity.138 But the assumption
built into the Model Rules of Professional Conduct139 that all—or
even most—partisan lawyers can in one moment represent their cli-
ents with zeal and in the next moment counsel their clients with ob-
jectivity, seems utopian, and at odds with social science evidence
about confirmation bias.
Is the nonpartisan stance, by itself, enough to produce more dis-
passionate or better calibrated lawyers? Or, as seems likely to us, is
repeated exposure to this kind of “alternative” thinking, as well as
actual practice in associated “oppositional” behaviors, needed for a
more flexible mindset to become habitual? If so, this research might
suggest that a more directive style of mediation—characterized by
interventions aimed at challenging participants’ overconfident or
unquestioning views of their non-resolution alternatives, and often
criticized in mediation writings140— should be given as much in-
structional exposure as more facilitative models, and certainly not
ruled out of bounds, as it is in certain schools and trainings.
138. See infra notes 192-94.
139. Compare, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE AND SCOPE § 2 (AM
BAR ASS’N 2013) with Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Rule 2.1 (2013).
140. See, e.g., Lela Porter Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not
Evaluate, 24 FLA ST. U. L. REV. 937 (1996).  Facilitative and evaluative approaches to
the mediator’s role are points along a continuum rather than dichotomous choices.
Mediators from both schools see aiding the parties in reaching a resolution as their
principal objective. Although most facilitators claim to focus on managing the pro-
ceedings rather than influencing outcomes, they, like evaluators, will often engage in
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Up until now, we have focused on the link between “greater dis-
passion and objectivity” and improved accuracy in the prediction of
judicial decisions. But in fact, skilled forecasting of case outcomes is
only one measure of the objectivity demanded of lawyers. Are there
other types of cognitive distortion that may be reduced by training or
working as a mediator?  For this, we turn to the research on perspec-
tive-taking, and its role in improving judgment.
V. DE-BIASING THROUGH PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
One means of reducing egocentric biases, hostile attributions,
and other motivated and unconscious perceptual distortions is the de-
velopment of the capacity and propensity for perspective-taking—
placing oneself in another’s shoes and actively imagining, if not
adopting, that person’s point of view.
This definition of perspective-taking has been in a state of flux
since becoming the subject of research inquiry. Although it has some-
times been used interchangeably with the term “empathy” in the
literature,141 the two concepts have more recently been seen as re-
lated yet distinct.142 In contrast to the (empathic) ability to feel what
another is experiencing emotionally, perspective-taking is seen as a
cognitive process of attempting to understand (or “mentalize”143) how
the world looks to another person. In short, one is a response of the
heart and the other of the head.
“agent of reality” behaviors designed to help disputants consider the possible conse-
quences of continuing with their dispute rather than resolving it, as well as asking
the parties questions about possible alternative outcomes or different ways that an-
other person might look at the problem. Directive or evaluative mediators are apt to
go further, making statements as well as asking questions, and suggesting possible
alternative viewpoints themselves by providing feedback on the strength of a party’s
case or the reasonableness of his or her stance, and trying actively to persuade reluc-
tant parties to consider these views.  Although more research on this point would be
useful, active and reflective engagement in such behaviors would seem to yield deeper
engagement of CTO-type thinking.
141. See, e.g., Mark H. Davis et al., Emotional Reactions to Dramatic Film Stim-
uli: The Influence of Cognitive and Emotional Empathy, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 126 (1987).
142. See Adam D. Galinsky et al., Why It Pays to Get Inside The Head of Your
Opponent, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 378 (2008).
143. Andrew R. Todd, et al., When Focusing on Differences Leads to Similar Per-
spectives, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 134 (2010).
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Research into the de-biasing effect of perspective-taking has
been ongoing for more than three decades. Some studies have consid-
ered the impact of perspective-taking on social goals, such as encour-
aging altruism or improving intergroup relations.144 Others have
sought to measure its more general effects in improving people’s ac-
curacy in perceiving others and eliminating egocentric and other cog-
nitive biases.145 Overall, the research suggests that deliberate efforts
at considering the perspective of others can enhance objectivity in
thought.146 Several of the major research strands can be summarized
as follows:
First, the perceptually distorting and socially problematic cogni-
tive bias147 inherent in out-group stereotyping has been the focus of
considerable experimentation. An example of this research is a 2000
study comparing the effects of attempts to suppress unwanted
thoughts about members of stereotyped groups with efforts to imag-
ine those persons’ actual life experiences.148 Subjects were all shown
a photograph of an older man sitting on a chair near a newspaper
stand and then told to write a short essay about a typical day in his
life. Before commencing this writing assignment, one-third of the
participants (called “suppressors”) were instructed to “actively avoid”
thinking about the photographed target in ways that are influenced
by “stereotyped preconceptions.” Another third (“perspective-takers”)
were told to write the essay “as if you were that person, looking at the
144. See, e.g., C. Daniel Batson, et al, Perspective Taking: Imagining How Another
Feels Versus Imagining How You Would Feel, 23 PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL.
BULL. 751, 757 (1997); John F. Dovidio et al., Perspective and Prejudice: Antecedents
and Mediating Mechanisms, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1537 (2004).
145. See, e.g., Kenneth Savitsky et al., The Unpacking Effect in Allocations of Re-
sponsibility for Group Tasks, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 447 (2004); Michael
Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, 37 J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 322, 330-32 (1979).
146. Adam D. Galinsky, Debra Gilin & William W. Maddox, Using Both Your
Head and Your Heart: The Role of Perspective Taking, in RESOLVING SOCIAL CONFLICT
IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL CONFLICT AND AGGRESSION 103-18 (Joseph P. Forgas et
al., eds. 2011).
147. Attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, actions, and decisions
in an unconscious manner are termed implicit biases. Such biases, which encompass
both favorable and unfavorable assessments, are activated involuntarily, are outside
an individual’s awareness or intentional control, and undergird attitudes about peo-
ple based on characteristics such as race, ethnicity, and age. For a recent discussion of
implicit bias in the litigation context, see Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Court-
room, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012).
148. Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Perspective-Taking: Decreasing
Stereotype Expression, Stereotype Accessibility, and In-Group Favoritism, 78 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.  708 (2000).
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world through his eyes and walking through the world in his shoes.”
The final third, the control group, received no special instructions.
Subjects in the first two groups—perspective-takers and sup-
pressors—both produced less stereotypic content in their essays. The
researchers cited this as evidence of those subjects’ enhanced con-
scious efforts at controlling their stereotypic thoughts compared to
those in the control group. But perspective-takers showed stronger
evidence of unconscious stereotype reduction than did suppressors:
when shown a series of words that contained both stereotype-consis-
tent (e.g., lonely, dependent, forgetful) and stereotype-irrelevant (e.g.,
scheming, envious, deceptive) words, the perspective-takers were sig-
nificantly slower than the suppressors in responding to the stereo-
type-consistent words. (Speed is a function of the accessibility of
stereotypic thoughts.149)
A second part of this study demonstrated how this form of de-
biasing works. To a greater extent than the other groups, perspec-
tive-takers saw the “self in others”: they used the same traits to de-
scribe themselves and the target (both the individual and the group
that he was thought to represent).150 Perspective-taking also seemed
to produce more positive evaluation of out-group members.151
Other studies using a similar perspective-taking methodology
(photo or video viewing, plus essay writing) have produced de-biasing
results that include a reduction in automatic negative evaluations
based on race152 and, relatedly, in subjects’ denial of discrimination
as a causal factor in the employment, housing and other disadvan-
tages encountered by ethnic and racial minorities.153
Indeed, perspective-taking seems to correct for attribution errors
generally. Errors in explaining the successes and shortcomings of
others can spawn deep conflict. As described in Part I, research has
demonstrated that humans are prone to explaining their own
achievements (or those of people they like) on the basis of their own
positive traits, while blaming external or situational factors for their
failures—and to reversing those attributions when assessing other
149. Id. at 713.
150. Id. at 716.
151. Id. at 719.
152. See Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking Combats Automatic Expres-
sions of Racial Bias, 100 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1027 (2011).
153. See Andrew R. Todd, Galen V. Bodenhausen, & Adam D. Galinsky, Perspec-
tive Taking Combats the Denial of Intergroup Discrimination, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 739 (2012).
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people, especially those in out-groups.154 But when observers are
prompted to engage in perspective-taking, they have been shown to
explain the successes of others more on the basis of their personal
traits and dispositions, while also producing more charitable, situa-
tional explanations for negative behaviors or consequences—much as
they do in evaluating their own successes and failures.155
Perspective-taking can also moderate self-centeredness in per-
ceptions about what is just or fair in social, relational and competi-
tive settings.156 Illustrations of such egocentric distortions are
numerous.  In one classic study, for example, subjects who were
asked to determine a fair allocation of pay for seven hours of identical
work that they and another person performed felt that they deserved
nearly $5 more than their colleague.157  Views propelled by such ego-
centric bias are not only inaccurate, but they can also trigger signifi-
cant conflict if seen as overly aggressive or immoral by others who
hold differing (and often similarly egocentric) perceptions.158
Research on individuals’ assessments of their own contributions
to a group task has revealed how egocentric bias operates and the
effect of a deliberate effort at perspective-taking in overcoming it.  In
one illustrative study,159 students ranging from elementary school to
college were assigned to complete a group project with three class-
mates their age and then to estimate their own individual contribu-
tion to the task. When aggregated, the sum of the four collaborators’
self-assessments of the proportion of the project they performed rou-
tinely exceeded 100%, by a large margin. In the process, subjects also
154. See supra note 60 and accompanying text, describing the actor-observer
effect.
155. See, e.g., Theresa K. Vescio, Gretchen B. Sechrist, & Matthew P. Paolucci,
Perspective Taking and Prejudice Reduction: The Mediational Role of Empathy
Arousal and Situational Attributions, 33 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 455 (2003); Robert
Gould & Harold Sigall, The Effects of Empathy and Outcome on Attribution: An Ex-
amination of the Divergent-Perspectives Hypothesis, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 480 (1976).
156. It may also be effective in tempering unwarranted optimism, a bias rooted in
an egocentric worldview. See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein & Elizabeth Lachendro, Egocen-
trism as a Source of Unrealistic Optimism, 8 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 195
(1982).
157. David M. Messick & Keith P. Sentis, Fairness, Preference and Fairness Bi-
ases, in EQUITY THEORY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 61, 70
(David M. Messick & Linda S. Cook eds.,1983).
158. Nicholas Epley & Eugene M. Caruso, Egocentric Ethics, 17 SOC. JUST. RES.
171, 172 (2004). Those who think their distorted worldview is objectively correct have
been dubbed “naı̈ve realists.”
159. Savitsky et al., supra note 145, at 449.
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routinely underestimated the collective contributions of their collabo-
rators. But when students were asked both to apportion shares of re-
sponsibility to themselves and also to “unpack” the collective
contributions of their teammates by assigning them each individual
shares of responsibility, the extent of egocentric over-claiming of per-
sonal credit, while not eliminated altogether, was reduced
significantly.160
What accounts for this tendency to overestimate one’s own con-
tributions to a group task? In competitive situations, self-serving mo-
tives may be at work: egocentric allocations of credit or responsibility
to oneself can lead to psychic, social, and tangible rewards. But this
tendency is not only produced by deliberate or strategic self-aggran-
dizement: the same results obtain in situations where subjects are
asked to estimate their role in an activity that reflects poorly on
them. In one study, for example, spouses overestimated not only the
share of housework they performed but also the proportion of argu-
ments they started.161
In view of such findings, researchers have settled on a cognitive
rather than a motivational explanation for the bias that occurs when
one compares oneself to others: information about one’s own contribu-
tions to a group experience is more readily accessible—both in quan-
tity and ease of retrieval—than is information about others,
especially, but not only, when they are part of a group. And this is
used as a heuristic or shortcut, in which data that is more accessible
or available is deemed more likely or frequent.162
By contrast, compelling subjects to consider others’ contributions
to a group effort reduces this bias by inducing them to think about
things they would otherwise have ignored. Put another way, one’s
own immediately available experience is the default basis for judg-
ment unless one is required to engage in a deliberate (and slower)
process of considering or inferring the perspectives of others.
But perspective-taking can produce ironic consequences. While
this de-biasing technique can yield more accurate thinking and objec-
tive assessment of what is fair, more cooperative behavior does not
160. The sum dropped from (a logically-impossible) 154.6% to 106.8%. Id. at 450.
161. Ross and Sicoly, supra note 145, at 326.
162. Id. at 322. This is known as the availability heuristic. See Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973); N. Schwartz et al., Ease of Retrieval as Information:
Another Look at the Availability Heuristic, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.  PSYCHOL. 195
(1991).
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necessarily follow. At least in settings viewed as competitive, the pro-
cess of contemplating another person’s perspective can also trigger
predictions that the other person will behave in a self-interested or
selfish manner. These cynical beliefs, in turn, can lead the perspec-
tive-taker to engage in aggressive conduct (“reactive egoism”163) as a
form of self-defense against the other’s (presumed or anticipated) ag-
gression. This consequence of perspective–taking has been verified
experimentally.
For example, in one study,164 subjects, assigned to one of four
commercial groups that fished a certain overharvested body of water,
were asked to state the percentage of the stock they thought was fair
for them to harvest and the portion that they would actually take.
Half of the groups, however, were first asked to consider the other
groups and what those groups would believe was their fair share,
while the remaining subjects received no such instructions. The per-
spective-taking groups showed a significantly less egocentric assess-
ment of what was fair for them to take. But those same groups
reported an actual intention to fish more of the shared resource than
subjects who had not engaged in perspective-taking. In competitive
settings, actual behavior seems to be determined less by beliefs about
what is objectively fair than by predictions about how others may act.
In a similar twist, while, as already noted, perspective-takers are
likely to engage in less stereotyped thinking, this process may also
cause them to behave more like the stereotype of out-group targets
they are contemplating. According to one study, this is because per-
spective-taking also yields an “other-self” overlap, in which the sub-
ject begins to see aspects of the target in him- or herself and to mimic
the target’s stereotypic mannerisms. Thus, for example, those who
actively took the perspective of a (stereotypically smart) professor
achieved higher scores on standardized tests than control group
members, while those who contemplated cheerleaders did worse.
Similarly, those who took the perspective of an elderly person tended
to cooperate on a prisoner’s dilemma game, while their counterparts
who had thought about life as an African-American male were more
likely to play the game aggressively.165
163. Nicholas Epley, Eugene M. Caruso & Max H. Bazerman, When Perspective
Taking Increases Taking: Reactive Egoism in Social Interaction, 91 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 872 (2006).
164. Id. at 875.
165. Adam D. Galinsky, Cynthia S. Wang & Gillian Ku, Perspective-Takers Behave
More Stereotypically, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404 (2008).
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A. Perspective-Taking and Lawyering: Negotiation Studies
Few, if any, studies of perspective-taking have involved lawyers
or law students as subjects. But perspective-taking—both as an abil-
ity or disposition and as a strategy—has been shown to yield signifi-
cant de-biasing effects when harnessed in negotiation, a pervasive
area of lawyer activity across all practice specialties.
The two cognitive distortions arguably most prevalent in negoti-
ations—the biasing influence of (usually extreme) initial offers or
“anchors,” and the “fixed pie” bias, which leads bargainers to hold
erroneous beliefs about the extent to which their own priorities are
diametrically opposed to those of people with whom they negotiate—
have been well documented in the empirical literature.166  So, too,
has the potential curative effect of perspective-taking on both of these
biases.
B. Perspective-Taking and the Anchoring Bias
Negotiations, by definition, take place against the backdrop of
uncertainty and, almost always, imperfect information for the par-
ticipants.  By making initial offers that are deliberately pegged at
some distance from their reservation price, negotiators can draw (or
“anchor”) the other side’s subconscious focus toward that stance and
thus gain an advantage in the bargaining. Anchoring bias can cause
affected negotiators to reach sub-optimal agreements, due to unnec-
essary concessions they may make. In extreme cases, this bias can
lead to an avoidable impasse if it leads the bargainer to perceive, in-
correctly, that there is no hope of achieving an acceptable agreement.
Several studies have demonstrated the role of perspective-taking
in neutralizing the impact of anchoring bias. In one representative
set of experiments,167 76 MBA students negotiated the potential sale
166. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974) (anchoring effect); Gregory B. Northcraft
& Margaret Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjust-
ment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 84 (1987) (same); Max Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, Heuris-
tics in Negotiation: Limitations to Effective Dispute Resolution, in NEGOTIATING IN OR-
GANIZATIONS 51 (Max H. Bazerman & Roy J. Lewicki eds., 1983) (fixed pie bias); Leigh
Thompson & Dennis Hrebec, Lose-Lose Agreements in Interdependent Decision Mak-
ing, 120 PSYCHOL. BULL. 396 (1996) (same).
167. Adam D. Galinsky & Thomas Mussweiler, First Offers as Anchors: The Role
of Perspective-Taking and Negotiator Focus, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 657,
660 (2001).
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of a pharmaceutical plant in buyer-seller pairings. All students, re-
gardless of role, received the same background facts and data on re-
cent comparable transactions and the uncertainty of the real estate
market. Each received a confidential reservation price that was
pegged to information in the shared background memo. Half of the
sellers and half of the buyers became the offerors, being told to make
the first offer. Half of the students in each offeree role were given
explicit perspective-taking instructions (consider the other person’s
alternatives, i.e., BATNA168) prior to negotiating; the other half (the
control group) received no instructions.
As measured by final price, negotiators (both buyers and sellers)
who made the first offer in the control condition reached, on average,
substantially better outcomes for themselves, capturing almost two-
thirds of the available bargaining range. In the pairings in which of-
ferees received perspective-taking instructions, however, the advan-
tage of making the first offer disappeared: final prices were similar
for all such offerees (buyers and sellers). The same results were ob-
tained in a second study in which subjects were told to think about
and focus on the opponent’s reservation price before negotiating.169
In short, the tendency or ability to think about information that is
inconsistent with the implications of the opponent’s first offer is a
major asset for negotiators.
C. Perspective-Taking and the “Fixed Pie” Bias
Experimental research has also demonstrated the impact that
perspective-taking can have in overcoming bargaining inefficiencies
posed by a zero-sum or “fixed pie” view of a negotiation problem. One
such study involved MBA student subjects negotiating the potential
sale of a gas station by a retiring station owner.170 Buyers were in-
structed that if the sale was consummated, they would need to hire
managers to run the station. Sellers were instructed (unbeknownst to
buyers) that they needed to finance the cost of a planned vacation,
and they would need to continue working after returning from their
travels. Although no deal was possible based solely on the buyers’
168. One’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement or “BATNA” represents the
negotiator’s bargaining boundary— i.e., the point (in cases of “sellers”) below or (in
cases of “buyers”) above which he should not settle. The term was first coined in
ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN 101-11 (1983).
169. Galinsky & Mussweiler, supra note 167, at 662.
170. Galinsky et al., supra note 142, at 379.
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and sellers’ reservation prices, the instructions allowed for an agree-
ment if it included a future contract to keep the seller on as station
manager after completion of the sale.
Two parts of the study—one based on perspective-taking disposi-
tions as measured on personality tests, and the other based on the
effects on buyer-subjects of a perspective-taking instruction (“[t]ry to
understand what they are thinking”)—showed that perspective-tak-
ers were better able to find hidden agreements and to create solu-
tions that met both sides’ needs than both a control group who
received no instructions and subjects who had been told to empathize
(“try to understand what [the service-station owner is] ‘feeling’ ”).171
 Although this study does not use the term “bias” or “fixed pie,” it
underscores the enhanced likelihood that those who are inclined or
instructed to understand the interests and purposes of a negotiation
opponent will achieve maximum “joint gains” and “creative
solutions.”172
A similar result was reached in an earlier study based on test-
measured perspective-taking ability. In a simulated MBA student ne-
gotiation of a multi-issue (wages, health plan, vacation pay, etc.) em-
ployment contract where a non-settlement would be submitted to an
arbitrator who would choose one of the parties’ final offers, higher
ability perspective-takers achieved higher value settlements and ar-
bitrator-chosen final awards than those with low perspective-taking
ability.173  Again, while the term “bias” or “fixed pie” was not used in
the study, it echoes the now-standard negotiation textbook perspec-
tive-taking exhortation to consider the opponent’s interests.174
Without overstating the lessons of such studies, their results also
point to a potentially far-reaching benefit for lawyers with strong per-
spective-taking skills: the ability to craft presentations that will ap-
peal to the vantage point of a judicial or other audience that must be
persuaded.  And, importantly for our purposes, the fact that in sev-
eral of these studies, simple instructions seemed to improve negotia-
tors’ natural perspective-taking performance suggests that this skill
can be taught.
171. Id. at 381, 383. Perspective-takers also obtained more favorable results on
the distributive (price) terms reached than those instructed to empathize; indeed, em-
pathizing was detrimental in that regard.
172. Id.
173. Margaret A. Neale & Max H. Bazerman, The Role of Perspective-Taking Abil-
ity in Negotiating Under Different Forms of Arbitration, 36 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 378,
386 (1983).
174. See, e.g., FISHER & URY, supra note 168, at 40-57, 52 (advising negotiators to
“[a]cknowledge [the other side’s] interests as part of the problem”).
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D. Mediation Questions and Applications
Perspective-taking—the ability to see things from another per-
son’s point of view—is arguably the mental activity most inherent in,
and necessary to, the work of mediators across all role orientations. It
is standard fare in leading mediation skills texts.175  While it may be
desirable for one in a partisan stance to develop this “difference
mindset”176 in order, for example, to understand the motivations and
interests of an adversary or a judge, a person in a neutral role seek-
ing to secure an acceptable resolution between competing parties
must attempt to imagine and ideally understand how each partici-
pant in a dispute views and experiences it.
Why is this so? To produce the change needed to resolve a conflict
or improve parties’ understanding of each other, information must be
exposed that counters the parties’ existing viewpoints and biases.
Unlike partisan representation, no successful outcome is possible in a
settlement- (or even transformation-)177 oriented mediation unless
the mediator forms accurate impressions of the participants, eliciting
highly individuated (and often concealed) information about them
and their perspectives. When a desired task outcome depends on such
accuracy, research indicates that people will think more deeply about
available information, paying increased attention to information that
is inconsistent with their initial impressions.178
Mediators continually engage in perspective-taking activities of
one kind or another. They must attempt to listen deeply to each side’s
narrative, with the goal of demonstrating (by, e.g., reflecting back)
understanding. They must take into account what underlies these
competing narratives in order to diagnose the severity of the conflict
and the barriers to resolution that seem to exist. Where needed, they
may, without distorting meaning, reframe toxic statements into less
175. See, e.g., FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 84, at 238-39; BUSH & FOLGER, supra
note 82, at 99-101.
176. Todd et al., supra note 143, at 135.
177. Transformative mediators see the main objectives of the process as increasing
the participants’ mutual level of empathy for or understanding of the other and em-
powering or educating them to be able to navigate this and other conflicts more suc-
cessfully. Settling or otherwise resolving the conflict is a potential byproduct of that
mission, but one that such mediators will not prioritize unless the participants decide
to pursue it. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 82, at 81-112 and passim.
178. See Steven L. Neuberg & Susan T. Fiske, Motivational Influences on Impres-
sion Formation: Outcome Dependency, Accuracy-Driven Attention and Individuating
Processes, 53 J. PERSONALALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 431, 441-42 (1987).
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destructive forms, or provide alternative interpretations of state-
ments or motives to enable parties to see their opponents in a differ-
ent, more intelligible light.
During the negotiation phase of a mediation, often in private
caucuses, mediators may speculate and inquire about each side’s un-
stated interests, needs and motivations in order to ease negotiations
and seek superior solution ideas; orchestrate attempts to engage the
parties in perspective-taking themselves through role reversal inter-
ventions; and tailor their own direct persuasion efforts to address
each side’s individual view of the conflict. The mediation setting thus
appears to foster good habits in developing a perspective-taking
mindset without presenting the competitive stakes that, according to
the research, can spawn negative attributions and aggressive
behaviors.179
However, it is not clear whether the mediation setting always
provides the right conditions for developing objectivity and percep-
tual accuracy. For example, successful perspective-taking seems to
require a minimum duration of observation of the person in ques-
tion.180 Might mediations that are too cursory or rushed fail to pro-
vide the requisite opportunity to develop perspective-taking capacity?
What about stressful mediations, with unlikable participants? Might
mediators’ emotional engagement in the settlement process color
their perceptions of difficult participants in ways that could compro-
mise their ability to read them accurately or treat them fairly?  Some
research suggests that tough settings can undermine or even negate
dispassion.181
In addition, are there potentially negative consequences for at-
torneys who develop their perspective-taking capacities? Put differ-
ently, when representing clients, might there be a danger in
developing an overly mediative mindset? It would certainly seem so.
179. Epley et al., supra note 163, at 886.
180. See William M. Bernstein & Mark H. Davis, Perspective-Taking, Self-Con-
sciousness, and Accuracy in Person Perception, 3 BASIC & APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1 (1982).
181. See, e.g., Markus Kemmelmeier & David G. Winter, Putting Threat into Per-
spective: Experimental Studies on Perceptual Distortion in International Conflict, 26
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 795, 800, 804 (2000) (American subjects placed
in the role of unaligned U.N. mediator seeking to broker peace between U.S. and Sad-
dam Hussein were no more accurate or objective about the hostility of the parties’
rhetoric than subjects placed in a partisan (U.S. military officer in the Gulf) role; only
historian-subjects looking back at the conflict 500 years into the future overcame
their partisan biases enough to be accurate); Cynthia McPherson Frantz & Ronnie
Janoff-Bulman, Considering Both Sides: The Limits of Perspective Taking, 22 BASIC &
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 31, 36-37 (2000) (variations in liking of others affect even-
handedness of perspective-taking).
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In some competitive situations, entertaining negative attributions
about an aggressive or exploitative opponent may be prudent and
adaptive.182 Misplaced trust can be as problematic as distorted mis-
trust. And as a curricular matter, despite its de-biasing potential, it
is possible that certain kinds of overly simplistic mediation train-
ing—training that, for example, takes a Pollyanna-ish view of conflict
or assumes that all disputes have problem-solving potential—may
actually prove harmful in developing sound lawyering judgment.
Nonetheless, when applied to the work of lawyers in a represen-
tative capacity, the development or strengthening of a perspective-
taking ability would seem to be a substantial asset, in ways that are
both more and less obvious. In client interviewing and counseling
tasks, it can enhance a lawyer’s ability to perceive clients and others
more accurately, to advise clients more objectively, and, when neces-
sary, to attempt to persuade them more effectively. Perspective-tak-
ing can improve interpersonal dealings with others in the system,
enhancing, for example, social cohesion in dealings with lawyers,
whether they are allies or opponents.183
In persuasion and negotiation tasks, perspective-taking is likely
to improve predictive accuracy and the quality of outcomes achieved.
Those who are adept at perspective-taking can better understand the
viewpoints of judges, arbitrators, and jurors and can better create
value by identifying the interests of others with whom they negoti-
ate.184 Perspective-taking may also enhance a lawyer’s diligence and
commitment, especially when representing difficult individuals or
pursuing tough causes that require a degree of selflessness. The ap-
preciation of the perspectives of others can increase the desire to help
them.185
182. See Roderick M. Kramer, Stalking the Sinister: Paranoia Inside the Labora-
tory and Out, in 7 RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 59, 85 (Robert J.
Bies, Roy J. Lewicki & Blair H. Sheppard eds., 1999).
183. See Gillian Ku, Cynthia S. Wang & Adam D. Galinsky, Perception Through a
Perspective-taking Lens: Differential Effects on Judgment and Behavior, 46 J. EXPERI-
MENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 792, 793, 797 (2010) (perspective taking can produce uncon-
scious mimicry).
184. Galinsky et al., supra note 142, at 388; Neale & Bazerman, supra note 173.
185. Although there is a debate as to whether the result is motivated by truly
altruistic (versus selfish) motives, the empirical literature is clear that perspective-
taking yields empathic concern, and that this reaction, in the case of persons in need,
produces a desire to help. See, e.g., C. Daniel Batson et al., Perspective Taking: Imag-
ining How Another Feels Versus Imagining How You Would Feel, 23 PERSONALITY AND
SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 751, 757 (1997); Sara D. Hodges et al., “Better Living Through
Perspective Taking,” in POSITIVE PSYCHOL. AS SOCIAL CHANGE 193-218 (R. Biswas-
Diener ed., 2011) (citing sources).
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VI. GENERAL DISCUSSION
A. Limitations of Current Research and Possible Topics for Future
Study
While the hypothesis that we have explored in this article is an
intriguing one, there are many gaps in the research and additional
questions to be answered before one can have confidence in its valid-
ity. First (to state the obvious), the only direct evidence that media-
tion-trained lawyers are less prone than lawyers in general to the
influence of cognitive or motivational biases comes from a single re-
search study from California (albeit one with a large sample and a
statistically significant finding186), which deals with only one kind of
(narrow, though important) applied task—predicting litigation case
results when advising clients about settlement.
The authors of the California study did not attempt to identify,
much less disaggregate, the specific cognitive processes that may
have enabled lawyer-mediators to perform better187 than other liti-
gators in predicting case outcomes, or to determine whether better
performance in this task might generalize to other judgments that
lawyers are regularly called upon to make. They did not try to mea-
sure the relative effects of mediation training versus mediation expe-
rience on the lawyer-mediators’ superior performance, nor attempt to
discover why their clients selected litigators with mediation training
in the first place, a possibly confounding factor.188
186. In his later book, the lead author of the California study characterized this
finding as “noteworthy, but essentially incremental.” BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG,
supra note 2, at 52.
187. It is possible that the Kiser et al. study does not provide evidence of lawyer-
mediators having better judgment than their non-mediator counterparts, but rather
different kinds of judgment. The study is limited to studying decisions by litigants to
demand more in settlement as plaintiffs, or offer less as defendants, than what was
ultimately awarded at trial or arbitration. The fact that clients of lawyer-mediators
fared better here may be due to their having received advice (or having utilized bar-
gaining approaches) colored by a pro-resolution or reconciliation bias under which
their lawyers were operating. In assessing good judgment, it is important to note that
the presence of such a potential bias in lawyers could lead their clients to make a
different kind of decision error—one of settling too cheaply (in the case of plaintiffs) or
too generously (in the case of defendants.) The Kiser study did not purport to measure
this, and in any event it would be difficult to do so. We thank Jon Bauer for this
insight.
188. See Kiser et al., supra note 2. It is also possible that the lower rates of deci-
sion error by those represented by lawyer-mediators in the Kiser et al. study com-
pared to other groups of lawyers may reflect those clients’ greater decision making
skills, rather than (or in addition to) their lawyers’ judgment. The lead author of the
study himself noted the possibility that clients with better decision making skills
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In hypothesizing what might explain this result, we have rea-
soned by analogy from social science experiments demonstrating the
de-biasing effects of two activities in which effective mediators char-
acteristically engage. But even as to these two, our database is lim-
ited. As promising as they are, none of the perspective-taking studies
we surveyed involved lawyers (or law students) directly, and all used
simulated, not real-world events that raise the usual external valid-
ity problems associated with social science research.189 In addition, to
the extent that this body of research has examined “lawyer-like” ac-
tivities, the exclusive focus has been on negotiation and studies on
assessments of fairness and blame. It would be useful to expand the
research to examine the effects of perspective-taking, if any, on law-
yers’ judgment in other contexts, for example, client counseling, an
activity in which virtually all practicing attorneys engage.
The results of the “consider-the-opposite” research are mixed,
with strong de-biasing effects demonstrated in many different do-
mains that include simulated lawyering activities, but with no statis-
tically significant results in the one major CTO study involving
lawyers’ outcome predictions in actual cases. Taken together, these
studies may demonstrate that a) as social scientists have suggested,
de-biasing in the real world, with real motivations and real stakes, is
more difficult to achieve than in the simulated world of the labora-
tory; and b) a single “consider-the-opposite” instruction (“list reasons
you may not achieve your objective”) in a social science experiment is
insufficient to mitigate partisan biases in the hurly-burly of the real
world. On the other hand, the results of the large-scale California
study of trial lawyers with which we began may suggest that the ef-
fects of mediation training and experience do, in fact, reduce real-
world biases.190
Throughout this article, we have assumed that the de-biasing ef-
fect observed in the California study results from the training that
mediators undergo to perform their work and the habits of mind they
form from repeatedly doing it. But it is possible that there could be a
selection bias at work that complicates, if not negates, this hypothe-
sis. Might the superior case outcome predictions by lawyer-mediators
might be more likely to choose litigators with mediation training and experience in
the first place. BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 2, at 52.
189. External validity refers to the extent to which research findings (from studies
classically involving college student-volunteer or other non-random subjects) can be
generalized beyond the particular study at hand to different people and settings. See,
e.g., ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL
METHODS IN LAW 38 (2009).
190. See Kiser et al., supra notes 2-7.
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in the California study be attributable to their pre-existing skills or
proclivities, in addition to—or instead of—their training and experi-
ence as neutrals? Although his findings are not directly relevant to
this article, Professor Lisle Baker has found that mediators take in
and evaluate information quite differently from both the public-at-
large and lawyers in general, as measured on the Myers-Briggs Type
Indicator, a widely-used psychological scale.191 Some of the research
we canvassed found that people who were most responsive and accu-
rate when instructed to use their perspective-taking capacities were
those who were already predisposed to doing so.192 Social scientists
have demonstrated that individuals vary substantially in the flexibil-
ity of their thinking, as measured on such psychometric assessments
as the “Need for Cognitive Closure”193 and “Need for Structure”194
scales. Are lawyers drawn to mediation naturally better perspective-
takers, or less doctrinaire in their thinking, than lawyers in the
main? Who seeks to become a mediator (and why) would seem to be
fruitful topics for additional research.
A final possible difficulty in drawing meaningful conclusions
about mediation from these studies is that they measure de-biasing
effects on their research subjects, who have been instructed by social
science investigators to consider and articulate alternative scenarios,
hypotheses or viewpoints. Reasoning by analogy to the setting in
which they work, at first blush mediators would seem to stand in the
position of investigators rather than subjects, since their primary role
is to help reduce the biases of others (the disputants) through their
interventions.195 While it seems likely to us that successful execution
191. R. Lisle Baker, Using Insights about Perception and Judgment from the My-
ers-Briggs Type Indicator Instrument as an Aid to Mediation, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
115, 125-26 (2004) (survey results finding, inter alia, that whereas only 27% of U.S.
adults and 56% of lawyers are “Intuitive” types, preferring to take in new information
by seeing patterns and implications, as opposed to absorbing new information con-
cretely, tangibly and sequentially (“Sensing” types), a full 80% of practicing New En-
gland mediators prefer “Intuition” as their mode of perception).
192. See Davis et al, supra note 141, at 131; Bernstein & Davis, supra note 180.
193. See generally ARIE KRUGLANSKI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CLOSED-MINDEDNESS
(2004).
194. See, e.g., Edward R. Hirt et al, Activating a Mental Simulation Mind-set
Through Generation of Alternative: Implications for Debiasing in Related and Unre-
lated Domains, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 374, 376, 381-82 (2004) (defining
“Need for Structure” (NFS) as a “preference to form and maintain simple knowledge
structures” and demonstrating that subjects who are low in NFS are more amenable
to CTO prompts).
195. See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush, What Do We Need a Mediator For?: Media-
tion’s “Value-Added for Negotiators, 12 OHIO STATE J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 9-15 (1996) (dis-
cussing how the presence of a mediator can overcome strategic and cognitive barriers
that might lead to impasse in unassisted negotiations).
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of such skills leads (and perhaps even requires) mediators to develop
their own perspective-taking and oppositional thinking abilities,
more research would be useful on this point.
B. Will Mediation Training Transfer to Representational
Lawyering?
Finally, assuming that training and practice in mediation helps
neutrals develop their general perspective-taking and oppositional
thinking skills, a critical further question remains: is there reason to
think that such learning will “transfer” to representational tasks
when they undertake to advise clients and to advocate on their
behalf?
The question of whether, and under what conditions, learning in
one context will carry over into another has been the subject of con-
siderable research and opining by education theorists.196 This work
has ranged from pre-school-age children to workplace trainees, with
overall results that suggest the difficulty of successful transfer.197
While a comprehensive treatment of the literature on teaching for
transfer and its varying viewpoints is beyond the scope of this article,
two main factors that appear to influence the likelihood of students
applying thinking derived from one learning domain to another are:
(a) how closely the teaching and transfer domains resemble or appear
connected to each other, and (b) how well the original course of in-
struction is designed to promote the goal of transfer of learning.198
One major school of thought thus focuses on the “distance” of trans-
fer: when the two domains are “near” to each other in terms of their
196. See, e.g., David Billing, Teaching for Transfer of Core/Key Skills in Higher
Education: Cognitive Skills, 53 HIGHER EDUC. 483 (2007); D.N. Perkins & Gavriel
Salomon, Teaching for Transfer, 46 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 22 (1988).
197. See Patricia A. Alexander & P. Karen Murphy, Nurturing the Seeds of Trans-
fer: A Domain-Specific Perspective, 31 INT’L J. EDUC. RES. 561, 563 (1999).
198. See D.N. Perkins & Gavriel Salomon, Transfer and Teaching Thinking, in
THINKING: THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 285 (D.N. Perkins et al, eds.,
1987); Billing, supra note 196.  While some education specialists cite differences in
individual motivation and other student traits in determining the likelihood of trans-
fer, we exclude these from our discussion as being beyond the control of most law
school course or curriculum planners. See, e.g., Robert E. Haskell, TRANSFER OF
LEARNING: COGNITION, INSTRUCTION AND REASONING 125-126 (2001) (differentiating
between students who seek to “master” a subject for the sake of deep learning and
those who merely aim to “perform” well in order to succeed in a course). But see Rich-
ard S. Prawat, Promoting Access to Knowledge, Strategy, and Disposition in Students:
A Research Synthesis, 59 REV. EDUC. RES. 1, 3-4 (1989) (asserting that such learning
dispositions can be cultivated in students by the instructor).
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concrete similarities,199 students will associate one with the other
easily,200 enhancing both the odds and the degree of transferred
learning. A frequently cited example is that of applying instruction in
driving a car to later trying to drive a truck. By contrast, where the
surface elements of performance or knowledge in the earlier and later
domains share little obvious resemblance, transfer is deemed “far”
and, as a result, less likely.
Related to the perceived overlap between domains is the cogni-
tive process by which transfer appears to take place. In situations
where students can intuitively perform in a later domain by virtue of
prior practice and experience in an earlier one, the transfer is “low
road.” (Examples are car-to-truck driving or playing one video game
after learning another with similar strategy or design features.) But
where students must engage in deliberate, mindful effort to apply
principles from the training setting in order to see the connection
with, and master another domain, the transfer is “high road,” i.e.,
more difficult and less likely. The “low road-high road” contrast has
been described as one between earlier learning “popping up” as op-
posed to having to be “dug out.”201
A review of the teaching or training conditions thought to be
most conducive to students achieving transfer reveals a number of
widely-shared principles. One key principle is making the goal of
transfer explicit. Instructors who systematically devote classroom
time to providing illustrative or analogous examples of applications of
course knowledge beyond the course’s boundaries can greatly en-
hance the odds of students making connections in those other set-
tings.202  Where the instruction also includes general principles
underlying the specific knowledge or skills taught (ideally by having
students arrive at such generalizations themselves203), the chances of
“high road” transfer increase.204 Another instructional feature widely
199. Perkins & Salomon, supra note 198, at 287; Tonya Kowalski, True North:
Navigating for the Transfer of Learning in Legal Education, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 51,
69 (2010).
200. Kowalski, supra note 199, at 69.
201. Billing, supra note 196, at 500-01; David N. Perkins, Steven Schwartz, & Re-
becca Simmons, A View from Programming, in TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF PROB-
LEM SOLVING: VIEWS FROM THE CONTENT DOMAINS 49 (Mike Smith ed., 1991).
202. This teaching-for transfer mode has been referred to as “hugging” the trans-
fer context target. Perkins & Salomon, supra note 196, at 28-29.
203. Billing, supra note 196, at 511.
204. Such instruction has been termed “bridging” the training and the transfer
domains. Perkins & Salomon, supra note 196, at 28-29.  Indeed, in the view of some
theorists, direct teaching of “mindful decontextualizing” principles and instruction in
metacognitive thinking, i.e. developing students’ awareness of their thinking patterns
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seen as promoting generalized learning is the opportunity for critical
reflection on one’s thinking and strategizing, through faculty-over-
seen journaling or other means.205 Such pedagogy instills learning at
a metacognitive level—i.e., students learn when and why to apply
certain skills and develop the ability to monitor their own judgments.
So where does mediation training fit in this analysis? Are there
factors unique to this subject matter that would suggest a likelihood
of its being retained in law students’ long-term memories and recal-
led at important moments in their work as lawyers?
With respect to instructional conditions conducive to transfer:
mediation clinical courses vary greatly in duration, depth, practice
opportunities, supervision, opportunity to reflect and other variables,
rendering any overall or blanket assessment of this factor impossible.
But virtually all mediation courses start with a potential advantage
not enjoyed by at least some survey-style experiential offerings:
rather than attempting to “cover” a very wide range of skills,206 medi-
ation courses tend to expose students to multiple, practice-based iter-
ations of a single set of skills, all within a discrete context.207 Depth
that stems from multiple but varied examples in a specific training
domain, according to most who study transfer, provides the strongest
and strategies and knowledge of when and where to use them, are at the heart of
creating conditions favorable to later knowledge transfer.
205. Billing, supra note 196, at 509.
206. The planned classroom components of some litigation clinics, for example, at-
tempt to cover client interviewing, advising, case planning, witness examination,
pleading drafting, discovery, negotiation and even jury selection—often in a single
semester.  Similarly, one-semester transactional clinics might attempt to teach inter-
viewing, planning, contract drafting, advising, and negotiation. Of course, clinical
courses need not be constructed this way, and many are not. Some clinicians prefer to
focus their programs’ casework and seminar components on multiple iterations of a
narrower range of lawyering tasks in order to help students achieve greater compe-
tency in those settings, as well as to promote transfer to others.  As for the desirability
of such depth in promoting skills transfer, see, e.g., Alexander & Murphy, supra note
197, at 568-569; David A. Binder & Paul Bergman, Taking Lawyering Skills Training
Seriously, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 191 (2000).
207. While there may be variations stemming from differing definitions of role and
dispute contexts, there exists a fair degree of consensus as to the process structure,
skills and sub-skills needed to function competently as a mediator. An examination of
the contents of texts designed for mediation courses and trainings will reveal this. On
the particular topics that are the focus of this article, compare FRENKEL & STARK,
supra note 84, at 193-98, 246-53, 238-39 (questioning for doubt, persuasion using role-
reversal and evaluation); JOSEPH B. STULBERG, TAKING CHARGE/MANAGING CONFLICT
95-97, 100 (1987) (same); DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE
STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS 207-08, 223-34 (1996) (same).
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pedagogical foundation for the importation of that learning to later,
different contexts.208
As for the “distance” between mediating and representing cli-
ents, the two professional settings and roles would, on the surface,
seem rather proximate—especially as to tasks likely to trigger biases.
Both roles include core skills that, but for the practitioners’ differing
duties, appear very similar, if not identical; the ability to seek and
interpret information in ways that will yield a complete picture of the
problem; the ability to unpack the interests and emotions that may
be driving the participants; the ability to assess the overall strengths
and weaknesses of competing presentations in order to predict and
advise; and the ability to understand competing perspectives in order
to negotiate or advocate well.209
Related to this, and perhaps more significant for these purposes,
is the nature of mediator thinking and behavior: in contrast to
courses that teach a set of domain-specific, “local knowledge”210 skills
needed to succeed in a particular setting (for example, how to draft a
pleading or contract, take a deposition or conduct an effective cross-
examination),211 mediation instruction imparts a core mindset and
approach that constitutes more “general” strategic knowledge.212
This kind of knowledge, according to one major viewpoint in the edu-
cation literature, is more likely to be transferred (albeit through
mindful effort in application) across domains.213 The two mediation
strategies discussed in this article—considering the opposite side of a
claim or argument, and exploring and reframing problems in light of
competing perspectives and emotional underpinnings—are classic ex-
amples of this kind of general knowledge.214
208. Alexander & Murphy, supra note 197, at 572-73.  When such thoroughness in
practice is spread out over time, the odds of long-term retention and transfer are fur-
ther increased. Ruth Clark & Merlin Wittrock, Psychological Principles in Training,
in TRAINING AND RETRAINING 60, 79 (Sigmund Tobias & J.D. Fletcher eds., 2000);
Binder & Bergman, supra note 206, at 201.
209. There are questions as to how to measure or define such “distance.” See
Anthony Marini & Randy Genereux, The Challenge of Teaching for Transfer, in
TEACHING FOR TRANSFER: FOSTERING GENERALIZATION IN LEARNING, 1, 4 (Anne
McKeough, Judy Lupart & Anthony Marini eds., 1995); Perkins & Salomon, supra
note 198, at 288.
210. See Perkins & Salomon, supra note 196, at 31.
211. We do not mean to diminish the importance of training in such skills, espe-
cially given the employment market challenges facing newly minted lawyers.
212. Perkins & Salomon, supra note 196, at 31.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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Some might argue that the ethical obligation (and other incen-
tives) to engage in client-favoring behavior when engaged in a repre-
sentational capacity negates the “nearness” or ease and resultant
likelihood of transferring the lessons of mediation to that context.
But are these really different (never mind opposing) skill sets? As
suggested earlier, the mediative mindset is not only compatible with
effective adversarial representation but, arguably, crucial to a law-
yer’s ability to serve clients unencumbered by biased, partisan judg-
ment. The key to effective transfer would seem to lie in a lawyer’s
being able to think like a mediator but also knowing when (and when
not) to act in a mediative way in pursuing a client’s goals. Although
this required differentiation215 may render the “road” to applying me-
diation learning a bit steeper, it need not block it.
Finally, as promising as the mediation-to-representation trans-
fer prospects may seem, these studies raise a number of important
questions: How best to design a mediation clinic to promote transfer
of learning? How lasting can the lessons of even the best designed
mediation clinic be? Is a single course sufficient or is repeated prac-
tice required? (The same questions, of course, could be asked about
any clinical experience.)
C. Curricular Implications for Law Schools and Clinical
Programming
The central thesis of this article is that placing law students in
the role of the neutral can improve their professional judgment by
reducing cognitive and motivational biases to which lawyers are
prone. If this thesis is valid, what are its implications for law school
clinical programming and for legal education in general? For schools
deciding what kinds of clinical opportunities to make available to
their students, one takeaway is that mediation instruction—in which
students are nonpartisans aiming to resolve conflict—deserves
greater curricular priority than it has historically been given.
215. This, of course, assumes that the mediation-trained lawyer understands the
standard conception of the lawyer’s role and is able to summon “warm zeal” on a cli-
ent’s behalf when it is appropriate. The importance of making that distinction in ac-
tion underscores the need for law students to develop comfort in undertaking an
advocacy stance and for mediation teachers to clarify the limits of the applicability of
the mediative mindset in order to guard against the risk of “negative transfer.”  Nega-
tive transfer takes place when learning in one context harms performance in another.
D.N. Perkins & G. Salomon, Transfer of Learning, in 11 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF
EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 6452, 6453 (T. Husen & T.N. Postelwhite eds., 2d. ed. 1994).
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Mediation clinics today constitute a very small percentage of in-
house clinical offerings at U.S. law schools.216 Even with a prolifera-
tion of various kinds of transactional, legislative and other policy-ori-
ented clinics in recent years, the great majority of in-house clinics
still focus on advocacy, in general civil or criminal litigation or in pro-
grams specializing in fields such as immigration or asylum law, chil-
dren’s rights, family law, domestic violence, low income tax
representation, civil rights and the like.217 Despite enormous growth
in the use of mediation in the legal system over the past twenty or
thirty years, law school instruction in this area is still very much
“training against the dominant paradigm.”218
There are many reasons—historical, economic, practical and po-
litical—for clinical education’s continued focus on litigation and pub-
lic interest lawyering, a detailed exploration of which is beyond the
scope of this article. Suffice it to say that the early impetus for the
development of clinical legal education programs was strongly influ-
enced by the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Gideon v. Wain-
wright,219 the Great Society programs of the 1960’s and early ‘70’s
and the desire to enlist the help of law schools in serving the unmet
civil and criminal legal needs of the poor.220 Outside pressures to im-
prove law school instruction in practical lawyering skills, especially
trial advocacy skills, also played a role.221 Supported by early seed
216. Exact statistics are hard to come by, but the best and most available source is
The Center for the Study of Applied Legal Education (CSALE) 2013-14 SURVEY OF
APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION 7, HTTP://WWW.CSALE.ORG/FILES/REPORT_ON_2013-14_CSA
LE_SURVEY.PDF. The CSALE study indicates that of 178 responding law schools re-
porting a total of 1322 distinct real case clinics, only 4.9% of all offerings are  “Media-
tion/ADR” clinics, a decline from the last CSALE study, conducted in 2011.  At least a
few of these, we know from our own experience, are not programs in which students
assume the role of neutral, but rather ones in which students represent clients in
mediation or arbitration proceedings.
217. Id. To be sure the clinical “tent” has gotten larger and more diverse in recent
years, with many clinics sprouting up that focus on additional transactional/planning
subject matter specialties such as community development, intellectual property and
entrepreneurship, and land use and environmental law. But the CSALE study sug-
gests that these sorts of programs are still to some degree outliers in the clinical land-
scape, at least as compared to litigation-oriented advocacy programs for poor people.
See id. at 7-8.
218. Stark, supra note 1, at 501.
219. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing a Sixth Amendment right to free legal coun-
sel for indigent criminal defendants charged with felonies.)
220. See generally Frank S. Bloch & Mary Anne Noone, Legal Aid Origins of
Clinical Legal Education, in THE GLOBAL CLINICAL MOVEMENT: EDUCATING LAWYERS
FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE (Frank S. Bloch ed., 2010).
221. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER STANDARDS FOR AD-
MISSION TO PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, reprinted in 83 F.R.D. 215 (1979); Edward J. Devitt, Why Don’t Law
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money provided by the Ford Foundation to select law schools,222
early clinical programs attracted to the academy progressive liti-
gators from the legal services, criminal defense and public interest
bars,223, many of whom were later able to hire like-minded colleagues
to help them expand the enterprise.224 The influence of these early
pioneers is still strongly felt in the overall landscape of clinical pro-
gramming today.225
The quest for social justice by U.S. law schools and law teachers
is, of course, important, as our society continues to struggle to meet
the legal needs of poor and near-poor people.226 The desirability of
including litigation-oriented advocacy programs among a menu of
clinical skills offerings is beyond question. And many social justice
and litigation-oriented clinical programs undoubtedly provide their
students with an outstanding educational experience.
Schools Teach Law Students How to Try Law Suits?, 29 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 631
(1980).
222. For a short history describing how early seed money was made available to
fund clinical legal education programs focusing on legal aid and public interest repre-
sentation, see, e.g., J.P. “Sandy” Ogilvy, Celebrating CLEPR’s 40th Anniversary: The
Early Development of Clinical Legal Education and Legal Ethics Instruction in U. S.
Law Schools, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 9 (2009).
223. For a lively early account from two such lawyers describing their transition
from public interest lawyering to clinical legal education, and their attempts to create
a curriculum out of whole cloth, see Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Report from
a CLEPR Colony, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 581 (1976).
224. For a history of one such program, and how the torch was passed from one
generation of clinical teachers to the next, see Laura G. Holland, Invading the Ivory
Tower: The History of Clinical Education at Yale Law School, 49 J. LEGAL ED. 504
(1999).
225. See, e.g., SUSAN BRYANT, ELLIOTT S. MILSTEIN & ANN C. SHALLECK, TRANS-
FORMING THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL
PEDAGOGY 302 (2014). (“Many of us in clinical education would call advancing social
justice for the poor, people of color, the disproportionately incarcerated, and other
marginalized groups our life’s work.”). A recently published empirical survey indi-
cates that the continuing public interest focus of many law school clinics is not lost
upon law school graduates, asked to evaluate the helpfulness of clinics and other ex-
periential offerings in easing their transition to law practice. Lawyers in private,
transactional and business-oriented practices reported both less participation in, and
less value derived from, their clinical experiences, in comparison with their peers in
public interest, government and litigation-oriented settings. See generally Margaret
Reuter & Joanne M. Ingham, The Practice Value of Experiential Legal Education: An
Examination of Enrollment Patterns, Course Intensity and Career Relevance, 22
CLINICAL L. REV. 181, 197, 202 and passim (2015).
226. See, e.g., Melanie B. Abbott, Leslie C. Levin & Stephen Wizner, REPORT TO
THE CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMMISSION 1 (Feb. 15, 2013);
Matt Apuzzo, Holder Backs Suit in New York Faulting Legal Service for Poor, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/nyregion/holder-backs-
suit-in-new-york-faulting-legal-service-for-poor. html?module=Search&mabReward=
relbias%3Ar%2C{%222%22%3A%22RI%3A16%22}&_r=0
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Nonetheless, to the extent that law school clinics continue to
maintain a top-heavy emphasis on litigation,227 they replicate the
(unintended, but nonetheless pervasive, powerful and culturally-rein-
forced) message resulting from legal education’s extensive use of the
case method: that trials and appeals are what law “is.” By focusing
predominantly on partisan representation of individuals or groups,
the majority of law clinics reinforce the “traditional conception of the
role of the lawyer as an advocate of his client and as someone else’s
adversary . . . a crabbed and incomplete conception . . . [that begs] the
question of what is at the core of lawyers’ work.”228 And when partic-
ular clinics or clinicians strongly prioritize a social justice agenda,
the partisan—and potentially biasing— pull on student-trainees’
thinking may be especially magnified.
Intense engagement in a client’s cause is, of course, energizing,
and it can produce the kind of commitment and performance we want
to inculcate in all our graduates. But as important as passion and
zeal may be for the modern advocate, objectivity and dispassion are
also critically important—for all lawyers. As important as it is for our
students to be able to empathize with those who are different from
them culturally or socio-economically,229 fostering understanding of
the viewpoints that motivate those who may differ with one’s clients
is a universal professional demand.
No one clinic can teach all skills, and the choice of specific clinical
offerings as part of an overall program involves a series of educa-
tional trade-offs. Nonetheless, if improving our students’ strategic
227. There is a redundancy in the clinical choices offered by many law schools that
may be masked by the way that the CSALE study, supra note 215, lists programs by
narrow subject matter area (e.g., Criminal Defense Clinic, Innocence Clinic, Criminal
Prosecution Clinic, Prisoners’ Rights Clinic, Death Penalty Clinic, etc.). Id. at 7-8. A
hypothetical law school that, for example, includes among its clinical listings a crimi-
nal defense clinic, a civil rights clinic, a juvenile justice clinic, a veterans’ benefits
clinic and an asylum clinic would seem to offer its students a wide array of choices.
But closer examination reveals that these courses teach substantially overlapping
skills—most notably interviewing, counseling, investigation, case planning and trial/
hearing skills— in different substantive law settings, to be sure, but all settings that
emphasize advocacy through litigation. Several highly regarded clinical programs
are, in fact, largely organized this way.
228. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neu-
tral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMPLE L. REV. 785, 785
(1999). We would note that as practiced today, law is such a highly diversified profes-
sion that it is hard to identify  any one “core” of it.
229. See, e.g., Sue Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, Five Habits for Cross-Cultural
Lawyering, in RACE, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 47 (Kimberly Barrett & William
George eds., 2005). Teaching for cross-cultural competence is a persistent theme in
clinical scholarship and list serve exchanges.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HNR\21-1\HNR101.txt unknown Seq: 57 31-MAR-16 9:08
Fall 2015] Improving Lawyers’ Judgment 57
thinking skills and decision making judgment is an overarching ped-
agogical goal for most clinicians (and we believe that it is),230 the re-
search canvassed in this article suggests that a well-designed
mediation clinic—in which students can learn to identify and manage
their own cognitive and motivational biases—may provide a pedagog-
ical platform of choice. Common representational clinic assignments
such as mooting both sides of an appellate argument, preparing a
witness for a hostile cross-examination, or identifying the possible in-
terests of a negotiation opponent, while useful exercises in “seeing
the other side,” are no substitutes for assuming a dispassionate role
in the middle of a dispute with real, human emotions.231 Good advo-
cacy is often seen as a process of considering the other side’s argu-
ments for the purpose of rebutting them. As one leading scholar has
observed, this is not the same thing as good thinking.232
So to return to a theme introduced at the beginning of this arti-
cle, the primary reason to include a mediation course as part of a
diversified array of clinical offerings is neither to train mediators per
se nor to introduce students to an important subject area in an in-
creasingly settlement-oriented legal culture.233 It is to train better
lawyers. Law school mediation teaching has been likened to a kind of
230. For an early, seminal article on the value of teaching problem-solving skills
in law school, see Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education—A 21st Century
Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL ED. 612, 612 (1984) (“[C]ritical analysis, planning, and deci-
sion making . . . are not themselves practical skills but rather the conceptual founda-
tions for practical skills and for much else, just as case reading and doctrinal analysis
are foundations for practical skills and for much else.”). For a more recent treatment,
see Mark Neal Aaronson, Judgment-Based Lawyering: Structuring Seminar Time in
a Non-Litigation Clinic, in TRANSFORMING THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL PEDAGOGY, supra note 225, at 81. (“I am less concerned
about the teaching of specific skills, like interviewing, counseling, fact investigation,
advocacy writing, or negotiating, though working on such skills is always part of the
mix. For me, the core role of a lawyer is to be a problem solver for others, for which the
most crucial attributes are thinking critically and exercising sound professional
judgment.”)
231. We assume that many if not most advocacy clinicians attempt to ensure that
their students consider the weaknesses in their clients’ cases and the perspectives of
litigation opponents or judges. One can see some examples of this in the clinical litera-
ture. See, e.g., KREIGER & NEUMANN, supra note 18, at 313-26 (urging students to
prepare for negotiations by assessing the rights, interests and leverage of both their
clients and the opposing party). If the research reported earlier in this article is valid,
however, its findings suggest that even the most capable of instructors may be influ-
enced by cognitive or partisan biases that are operating beyond their awareness.
232. BARON, supra note 26, at 214.
233. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUDIES 459 (2004)
(tracing “startling” decline in the percentage and number of trials across all catego-
ries of cases in both state and federal courts over a 40-year period from 1962 to 2002).
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“cross-training”234—training in an additional sport in order to im-
prove performance in the main one.235 The analogy strikes us as apt.
Like basketball Hall-of-Famer Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, who perfected
his sky hook but also regularly practiced yoga to improve his flexibil-
ity on the court,236 mediation trainees strengthen their traditional
legal muscles while building others not typically well developed in
law school, all in the service of bringing broader perspective and more
dispassionate judgment to their work as representative lawyers.
A similar point can be made about the overall law school curricu-
lum, given its strong emphasis on the development of critical think-
ing skills. If we want our students to be aware of the potential risk
that biases will cloud their judgment when they act in a representa-
tive lawyering role, we must make such learning a focus of their law
school experience. In addition to teaching traditional legal analysis,
we need to further develop students’ powers of perspective-taking
and open-minded thinking, through repeated, dispassionate practice
in these skills. Dean Kronman’s comments notwithstanding,237 the
overarching mode of instruction—studying legal problems in
casebooks largely stripped of their human and interpersonal dimen-
sions—seems neither designed nor well-suited to promoting these
habits. As important as it may be, training students to pick apart the
reasoning of judges provides little reason for confidence that they will
be able to pick apart their own reasoning when they begin to assume
responsibilities to clients.
234. Art Hinshaw at the 2013 AALS Conference on Clinical Legal Education, Ple-
nary Session in San Juan, Puerto Rico: “The Changing Face of Clinical Legal Educa-
tion: Models, Pedagogies and Opportunities for Transfer” (April 29, 2013).
235. Wikipedia, Cross-training, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-training (as of
Jun. 28, 2015, 3:41 AM).
236. John Morgan & Stephen A. Shoop, M.D., Kareem Abdul-Jabbar is hot for
yoga, USA TODAY (Sept. 27, 2003, 6:40 AM).  http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/
health/spotlighthealth/2003-09-26-jabbar_x.htm.
237. KRONMAN, supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
